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Abstract  
The first introduction of market competition concept was by Adam Smith in the  
18th century. This inspired scholars for two main views of competition: static  
and dynamic. The development of several theories of competition has resulted  
in numerous methodologies to measure banking competition that can be  
classified into two main categories: structural and non-structural. Moreover, the  
history of competition law began in the USA, UK and the EU who have  
succeeded in building solid antitrust regimes. On the other hand, the young  
economies of the Gulf region have enacted competition law very recently and  
lacks clear merger guidelines especially for the banking sector. A 
comprehensive  and detailed review of competition theories, policies, and 
measures applied by  both academics and antitrust authorities worldwide show 
that there is a  disagreement in the banking literature regarding which 
competition measures  best reflect the degree of competition given the 
strengths and drawbacks of each  measure. Also, banking regulations in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  countries lacks clear merger guidelines and 
ignores measures of competition as  one of the criteria. This thesis proceeds 
with three main empirical analyses.  
The first empirical chapter explores the market structure and the size-structure  
relationship in the GCC banking industry over the period 2000-2017. The  
concentration measures indicate that the GCC banking market are operating  
under somewhat concentrated conditions except for UAE and Saudi Arabia.  
Also, there exist a lower bound to concentration and the market remains  
concentrated regardless of market size. This implies that the banking industry  
of the GCC is an endogenous sunk cost industry, whereby the limiting levels of  
concentration are positive and bounded well above zero. Moreover, the limiting  
levels are increasing over time, so largest banks become more dominant, and 
are  different between individual countries due to market size and set-up costs.  
Finally, the values of the limiting and actual levels of concentration are  
astonishingly close, which indicates that the banking markets of the GCC  
countries are operating under a long-run equilibrium.  
The second empirical chapter investigates the competition in the GCC 
banking  sector by applying the modified Lerner Index that takes the scale of 
operation  
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into account. We find evidence that up to 86% of banks are optimally scaled.  
About 10% of banks are larger than the maximum productive scale size, and 
the  market power of nearly all of them is larger than that suggested by the  
conventional Lerner Index. Half of the banks that operate with economies of  
scale actually have larger market power than the conventional Lerner Index  
predicts. These results may be manifestations of the future, where some banks  
that have large market power consolidate and grow even further.  
The third empirical chapter examines the relationship between banking  
competition and financial stability in the GCC banking sector over the period  
2000–2017. The paper proceeds with three main analyses. First, we examine 
the  scale economies of GCC banks in a statistical sense and find that around 
85%  of bank-years are operating under economies of scale whereas the 
remaining 15%  are at the optimal scale. Second, we measure banks’ market 
power using the  Lerner Index and a scale-corrected Lerner Index. Both 
versions of the Lerner  Index indicate that banks under economies of scale 
enjoy higher market power  than banks with the optimal scale. Finally, we 
examine the competition–stability  relationship between GCC banks. Overall, 
higher market power leads to greater  financial stability, in line with the 
competition–fragility view. This full-sample  relationship holds across all GCC 
countries except for Qatar, where the cross  
country analysis shows that higher competition contributes positively to  
stability.  
Keywords: GCC; Competition; Retail Banks; Scale Economies; 
Concentration;  Competition Law; Competition Theory; Bank Competition; 
Financial Stability  
JEL Classification: D4; G2; C5; L1 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
The world economy has been facing persistently low growth, which has brought  
more universal attention to competition as a substantial driver of performance  
and  superb  innovation  in  a  national  economy.  Hence,  a  driver  of  economic  
growth  and  consumer  welfare. Competition  in  the  marketplace  will  foster  
economic  growth  and  prosperity  by  promoting  the  productivity  of  firms  and  
industries,  enhancing  the  competitiveness  of  domestic  firms  internationally  
(which  will  lead  to  higher  export  levels),  and  ensuring  that  lower-income  
consumers benefit from vibrant economic activity (Goodwin & Martinez Licetti,  
2016).  
The  banking  sector is a major area  of interest within  the  field  of  competition, 
because of the crucial role that the financial intermediation services play in the  
economy. The context of the recent financial crisis has also ignited this interest  
(e.g Efthyvoulou & Yildirim, 2014). Of particular concern is the macroeconomic  
outcomes  of  banking  competition  (e.g.  Cetorelli,  2004;  Coccorese,  2004).  
Competition  within  banking  is  a  fundamental  factor  of  promoting  three  main  
aspects  of  this  sector:  efficiency,  access to  finance,  and  systemic  financial  
stability. The relationship between banking competition and these three aspects  
has been explored in several studies. While  the literature yields mixed results,  
most research suggests that banking competition enriches the banks’ efficiency  
and improves access to credit without necessarily undermining the stability of  
the  financial  system (Boyd &  De Nicoló,  2005; World  Bank,  2012;  Beck  et  al.,  
2013; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014; Kick & Prieto, 2015).  
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region offers an interesting case of analysis  
in this field, since all the GCC governments are pursuing economic diversification  
policies to reduce heavy reliance on oil as a primary source of income. Henceforth  
the Gulf region and GCC will be used interchangeably. The banking sector, which  
dominates the financial sector, is seen as a crucial sector of the region and has  
been a key driver for the GCC’s economies and an important factor in achieving  
these plans (Abuzayed et al., 2018). Hence, it is crucial  to assess  the degree of  
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competition  in  the  banking  sector,  where  the  performance  is  predominately  
associated with the market structure. However, to date, there are only a limited  
number of studies conducted for the Gulf region (e.g. Al-Muharrami et al., 2006).  
Moreover, competition policy generally comprises a set of policies and provisions  
that maintain fair competition in the marketplace and ensure that there are no  
restrictions to competition that will reduce economic welfare. The chief objective  
of competition policy is thus to promote economic growth and social prosperity  
by  protecting  competition  (Goodwin  &  Martinez  Licetti,  2016). Competition  
policy and antitrust laws and regulations have a long history that can be traced  
as  far  back  as  the  19th century. Yet  again,  the  GCC  countries  have  not  paid  
attention  to  competition  law  and  policy  until  very  recently.  This  attention  is  
mainly  driven  by  the  economic  visions  of  these  countries  of  achieving  a  
diversified economy and reducing the heavy reliance on oil revenues.   
To  date,  empirical  analysis  to  test  the  degree  of  competitiveness  in  the  GCC  
banking sector are exceptionally limited and are applying traditional methods of  
measuring competition  that are criticised  for many shortcomings. Besides,  the  
existing literature in that field for the GCC countries is relatively not recent and  
did not take into account the recent global financial crisis period. This might have  
had a significant influence on the market structure of these six countries. Analysis  
of the  relationship  between the  competition  and financial  stability in  the  Gulf  
region is also relatively sparse.  
1. Philosophy of Science   
This  section  presents  the  research  approach  philosophy  of  the  thesis  prior  
to  further  enlightenments  about the  market  structure,  competition  and  
financial  stability in the banking industry.   
A  well-known  quote  of  the  Greek  philosopher  Heraclitus  (535–475  B.C)  
regarding the everlasting changes in  the universe “there is nothing permanent  
except  change” (Wheelwright,  1974).  In  the  banking  sector  context,  perpetual  
changes such as global crises and expansion of market size influence the decision  
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making  and  market  behaviour.  Therefore,  this  sheds  the  light  on  multiple  
questions. Is there a relationship between the market structure and market size?  
Does  competitive  behaviour  diverge  among  the  same  sector  in  different  
geographical locations? What is the role of scale economies? What are the effects  
of  these  changes  on  the  stability  of  the  financial  sector? Amongst  others, how  
these changes are reflected on the oil based GCC economies? In this thesis, these  
philosophical  considerations  have  been  investigated  through  empirical  
examinations.   
The  research  philosophy  of  this  thesis  is  conducted  according  to  the  
epistemology  approach  with  positivism  doctrine.  The  epistemology  approach  
underlies  the  entire  research  design  and  governs  the  selected  theoretical  
doctrine (i.e. positivism or interpretivism). It is primarily about “how we know  
what we know” (Crotty, 1998, p. 8). This approach is mainly based on assessing  
the economic theories through the collection of real-world data. The positivism  
doctrine  highlights  that  the  researchers  should  take an  objective  position and  
should  not  be  driven  by  their  own  preferences.  One  way  to  satisfy  this  
assumption  is  by  primarily  considering  and  testing  the  existing  theoretical  
framework and then generating new principles. In other words, the positivism  
doctrine  relates more  to  testing  existing  theories  rather  than  developing  new  
ones (Crotty, 1998). In this framework, the empirical chapters of this thesis are  
constructed by,  first deriving the research hypotheses, then collecting the data  
and finally using the appropriate methodology.   
A quantitative methodology of econometrics with secondary data from credible  
sources is adopted in this thesis. The empirical methods have been selected in  
adherence  with  previous  relevant  literature and  have  been  checked  for  
robustness.  Subsequently,  the  selected  variables  exhibit  both  the  theoretical  
predictions  as  well  as  suggestions  from  previous  studies.  The  chosen  
methodology of econometrics is in line with the positivism doctrine. Under this  
method,  inferences  are  produced  using  more  a  deductive  approach  (theory  
driven) and less an inductive approach (data driven). The inductive approach has  
been  only  utilised  to  link  the  findings  of  the  thesis  with  previous  empirical  
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studies.  As  a  result,  the  chosen  econometrics  methodology  in  this  thesis  
uses  mathematics and statistics prevailed by the economic theories.   
2. Motivations of Thesis  
The GCC economies have experienced a remarkable and continuous growth over  
the last two decades. According to the World Bank GDP ranking of 2018, the GCC  
economies are ranked jointly as the top 12th economy worldwide. The young yet  
vibrant  economies  of  the  GCC, have  benefited  from  the  massive  oil  revenues  
which have contributed highly in boosting the economy of the region. As a result,  
the  GCC  economy has started  to  compete  globally  and  has already  overtaken  
some developed countries such as Switzerland.   
During the last three decades, the GCC banking markets went through significant  
and promising reforms. Primarily, these reforms introduced the implementation  
of  financial  liberalisation  policies  and  financial  restructuring  policies.  More  
recently,  the  central  banks  in  the  GCC  countries  have  introduced  corporate  
governance-related  standards  and  risk  management  rules  in  accordance  with  
Basel III. The sole objective is to enhance the sector’s competitiveness (Abuzayed  
et al., 2018). Banks do and will be playing a prominent role in GCC countries, so  
special attention needs to be paid to the market structure, competitiveness’ and  
stability of  the  banking industry in  the  Gulf  region.  Even though  there is well  
established  literature  of  competition  and  stability,  there  is  still  a  large  
unexplored part especially for the GCC countries. Therefore, this thesis aims to  
fill these crucial gaps in the literature.  
This  research  makes  a  number  of  important  methodological  and  empirical  
contributions to the literature. First, the traditional inverse relationship between  
market  structure  and  market  size  has  been  criticised  for  only  being  valid  in  
certain  industries.  Sutton  (1991)  argues  that  endogenous  fixed  costs  play  a  
dominant  role  in  determining  the  equilibrium  structure  and  in  such  case  the  
industry  remains  concentrated  regardless  of  the  size. Hence,  the inverse  size  
structure relationship breaks down. Surprisingly, the literature does not provide  
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much analysis in this field. For these reasons, Chapter 4 of this thesis extensively  
investigates the size-structure relationship in the GCC banking industry.   
Second, there is a  significant  debate in  the academic literature  concerning  the  
reliability of the different measures of competition. While the Lerner Index has  
come to represent the standard measure of market power (Blair & Sokol, 2014),  
it fails to recognise the actual market power in the presence of scale economies  
(Spierdijka & Zaourasa, 2018). In this context, we apply both the traditional and  
the modified Lerner Index, that takes the scale of operations into account in order  
to explore the difference of competitiveness between banks under economies of  
scale and diseconomies of scale (Chapter 5).   
Third, the literature provides no consensus about the relationship between bank  
competition and  financial  stability. The  competition–fragility  view,  on  the  
one  hand, suggests that higher competition leads to higher fragility (Keeley, 
1990). On the other hand, the competition–stability view argues that more 
competition  results in greater stability (Boyd & De Nicoló, 2005). In Chapter 6, 
therefore, we  investigate the impact of the bank competition on the bank 
stability of the Gulf  region, as well as across individual GCC countries.  
Finally,  the  GCC  authorities  until  very  recently, have  not  paid  attention  to  
competition  law  and  policy.  The  findings  of  this  thesis  can  serve  as  solid  
guidelines for policymakers. It provides a comprehensive review of competition  
measures applied by authorities worldwide. Also, we draw attention to neglected  
issues in banking, that can have significant effects on the financial stability and  
consumer welfare.   
3. Research Questions  
In order to remedy the gap in the literature, this thesis presents three empirical  
examinations. The research questions that this thesis attempts to posit are the  
following:   
i. Is  there  a  difference  between  measures  of  competition  applied  by  
academics and by competition authorities? 
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ii. Why  studying  market  structure  is  essential  for  analysing  competitive  
conditions?   
iii. What role scale economies play in the analysis of competition?  iv. Does 
banking competition enhances financial stability in the Gulf region? v. What 
policy implications and competition legislations improvements are  needed in 
the Gulf region?  
4. Aims and Objectives  
Having discussed about the motivations of the thesis, we now turn to list the aims  
and  objectives.  This  thesis  presents  two  comprehensive  reviews  of  literature  
chapters and three empirical examinations and, hence, the thesis has six aims and  
several objectives.   
The first aim is to provide a comprehensive and detailed review of competition  
theories  and  measures,  with  a  focus  on  the  banking  sector  (Chapter  2).  The  
second aim  is  to  review  the  history  of  competition  policy  and  competition  
measures applied  by authorities worldwide  (Chapter  3).  Therefore,  this  study  
critically  reviews  both  the  academic  and  the  practical  literature  concerning  
competition in  the  banking  sector  and  evaluates the most  significant  features  
within  the  field. The third aim  of  the  thesis is  to investigate  the  size-structure  
relationship  in  the  GCC  banking  industry.  The  fourth aim  of  the  study  is  to  
examine  the  competitive  conditions  of  GCC  banking  sector  using  most  recent  
methodologies. The  fifth aim  is  to  identify  the  key  influences  of  banking  
competition  on  financial  stability in  the  GCC. The final aim is  to interpret  the  
results and propose recommendations and policy implications to the regulatory  
authorities and participants in the banking sector of the Gulf region. It is hoped,  
this will be the  first compressive study of competition in the banking sector of  
the GCC region.  
The objective of the first empirical examination (Chapter 4) is to investigate the  
current  market  structure  and  the  size-structure  relationship  for  the  banking  
industry of the GCC during the period 2000-2017. In Particular, we measure the  
current concentration levels in the GCC banking sectors, and investigate whether  
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larger  banking  markets  exhibit  unconcentrated  conditions  compared  to  
their  smaller counterparts. The existing literature has not paid much attention 
to this  field of research. We address this issue and investigate whether the 
inverse size structure relationship applies to the banking industry of the Gulf 
region.   
The  objective  of  Chapter  5 is  to  undertake  research  to  examine  the  degree  
of  competition in the banking industry of GCC countries, analysing 79 banks for 
the  period  2000-2017.  We  utilise  the  Lerner  Index  and  a  scale  corrected  
Lerner  Index, in order to have precise estimates of banking competition. By 
considering  the  scale  economies,  we  provide  estimates  of  competition  for  
banks  in  the  different stages of the production cycle.  
Finally, yet just as important, the third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) intends to  
examine  if  banking  competition  is  beneficial  to  the  stability  of  the  financial  
system. Given that the competition can either enhance or undermine stability, we  
investigate  whether  competition  in  the  banking  system  of  the  GCC  leads  to  
a  higher stability or a higher fragility.   
5. Contributions  
This research makes valuable contributions. The main objective of this study is  
to  provide  the  participant  in  the  banking  sector,  managers,  researchers  and  
policymakers  with  an  overview  of  the  existing  literature  regarding  the  
competition  in  banking.  In  addition,  the  competition  research  for  the  GCC  
countries is rather limited, the majority of the studies have been conducted for  
developed economies. Hence, we  fill  this important yet unexplored part of  the  
literature  with  new  empirical  evidence.  Even  though  the  thesis  has  a  few  
conceptual and theoretical contributions, the main contributions are empirically  
related. In particular, we provide empirical evidence regarding market structure,  
competition and financial stability in an area which is drawing attention to the  
banking industry, the GCC region.   
For all the empirical chapters, this thesis makes an original contribution to the  
GCC banking sector through the data preparation, methodological and empirical  
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contributions, as these represent the basis for accurate empirical results. In this  
context, tremendous effort has been made to compile a clean and cross-validated  
dataset of the GCC banks for the last 18 years. The dataset includes all national  
retail banks operating in the GCC. The sample includes longitudinal data for the  
period of 2000–2017. The earlier years were excluded due to the unavailability  
of  data  and  major  changes  in  the  accounting  standards.  This  comprehensive  
dataset comes from four different sources: Bloomberg; annual reports of banks;  
S&P  Global  Market  Intelligence;  and  BankScope  databases.  This  dataset  has  
undergone several processes to assure reliability and consistency over the entire  
sample  period. This  dataset  is  used  for  the  three  empirical  examinations  and  
represent a major contribution to the empirical analysis.   
The empirical work presented here, provides the most comprehensive study on  
the topic of banking competition and can serve as a reference point not just for  
the GCC countries, but for all various banking sectors in the world. Moreover, the  
empirical  and  methodological  contributions  postulate  a  clear  and  well  
established  guidance  towards  research in  the  competition literature  for  other  
industries  as well. Hence,  this  thesis  contributes  to  the  extensive literature  of  
competition both empirically and methodologically and is not limited to a specific  
region. The specific contributions of each empirical chapter are presented below.   
5.1. First Empirical Chapter: Chapter 4  
In the first empirical chapter, the study goes beyond the traditional literature and  
allows the market structure to vary over time and across countries. To the best  
of our knowledge, this is the first study to test Sutton (1991) theory in the GCC  
banking industry.  
In  addition,  this  is  the  first  attempt  to  evaluate  the  market  structure-size  
relationship with a  time-varying stochastic  frontier approach. Particularly,  the  
Weibull  distribution  using  maximum  likelihood  and  minimum  distance  
estimators are employed (Dick, 2007; Ellickson, 2007). The literature, moreover,  
utilises cross-sectional data and estimates  the equilibrium market structure at  
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one point of time. In this chapter, we utilise panel data and extend the original  
model to capture any heterogeneity over time and across individual countries.   
5.2. Second Empirical Chapter: Chapter 5  
The  second  empirical  chapter contributes to  the  growing  area  of  banking  
competition in  four  ways. First,  this  research  examines  the  degree  of  banking  
competition  in  the  six  countries  of  the  Gulf  region,  who  pursue  major  
diversification policies, and pay special attention to the banking sector as a key  
driver  for  such  policies.  It  is  therefore  of  great  importance, to  assess  the  
competitiveness of the banking market in this region, about which the existing  
literature does not provide much evidence. Second, we apply the modified Lerner  
Index,  which  provides  a  more  comprehensive  picture  of  competition  and  
explores the competitive differences between banks operating under economies  
of scale and diseconomies of scale. Third, a tremendous effort has been made to  
compile a clean and cross-validated dataset of GCC banks for the last 18 years.  
The dataset includes all national retail banks operating in the GCC. This dataset  
has gone through several processes to assure reliability and consistency over the  
entire sample period. Finally, this study offers empirical evidence that can serve  
as a solid base for policy implications.  
5.3. Third Empirical Chapter: Chapter 6  
This  third  empirical  chapter contributes  to  the  rich  literature  on  the  
competition–stability relationship in several ways. First, we examine the impact  
of competition on the stability of the GCC banking sector. The GCC governments  
have been following an enormous economic diversification policy to reduce their  
heavy reliance on oil as their primary source of income. The justifiable concern  
about  economic  development  is  therefore  the  competition  and  market  power  
that are prevailing in the banking sector and their impact on financial stability.  
Second, this study examines the average competition–stability relationship in the  
region  as  well  as  across  countries.  It  is  the  first  study  – to  the  best  of  our  
knowledge  – to  explore  the  heterogeneity  of  this  relationship  across the GCC  
countries  and  hence  contributes  directly  to  the  ongoing debate  on  regulatory  
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reforms.  Third, this study also tests for the impact of competition on the driving  
forces of financial stability represented by banks’ profits, income volatility, and  
capital levels. These in turn present the main driver of bank stability in the Gulf  
region. Fourth, we consider the impact of the presence of economies of scale on  
both  the  competition  and  the financial stability  level.  This  phenomenon  has  
largely  been  ignored  in  the  competition–stability  literature.  Moreover,  we  
estimate the cost function using system equations and test the scale economies  
in a statistical sense. Furthermore, this study is based on a comprehensive and  
well-scrutinised dataset of GCC banks that includes all national retail banks in the  
region. Lastly, the findings can have significant implications for policymakers and  
regulators in the Gulf region and worldwide.  
6. Linkage among the Empirical Chapters  
Banks in the GCC play a central role in the national diversification plans as the  
main finance providers of a broad range of sought-after investments in different  
sectors of the economy. As can be seen from Chapters 2 and 3, however, empirical  
investigations of the banking markets of this region are relatively sparse. This is  
the first study in the PhD research domain, – to the best of our knowledge that  
explores the market structure, competitiveness, and financial stability in the GCC  
banking systems.   
In particular, the thesis brings together three major issues. The first issue, which  
is presented in the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4), is how concentrated are  
the banking markets in the GCC, and does concentration levels vary radically with  
market  size.  This  chapter  ascertains  that  the  GCC  banking markets in  general  
have  been  operating  under  concentrated  conditions.  Although  the  level  of  
concentration  varies with  the  size  of markets,  the markets will always exhibit  
some concentration and will never reach unconcentrated conditions. This is due  
to  the  nature  of  the  banking  industry,  whereby  quality  improvements  rely  
heavily  on  endogenous  fixed  costs  and  thereby  raise  entry  barriers.  Such  
industries  can  be  termed  as  natural  oligopoly  industries.  This  provide  an  
interesting  conclusion  that  concentration is  not  always  harmful  for  consumer  
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welfare.  In  this  case,  for  instance,  concentration  leads  to  greater  a  quality  
of  services provided to consumers.   
Having  examined  the  market  structure  which  the  GCC  banking  markets  are  
operating  under,  Chapter  5  provides  estimates  of  the  degree  of  competition.  
Overall, the levels of competition lie somewhat in the middle between the two  
market extremes, monopoly and perfect competition. It can be said the banking  
markets  of  the  GCC  have  an  oligopolistic  nature,  which  coincides  with  the  
findings  of  the  first  empirical  chapter.  Moreover,  the  ranking  of  countries  in  
terms  of concentration and competition levels  varied  for some countries. This  
emphasises  the  criticism  of  other  scholars,  who  argue  that  concentration  
measures are not always a good proxy  for competition (see e.g. Claessens and  
Laeven  2004;  Carbo-Valverde,  Rodrguez-Fernndez,  and  Udell  2009).  In  this  
chapter, we also test for the scale of operation and find that most banks in the  
GCC are operating under the optimal return to scale.   
Given the concentration and competition levels as well as the scale economies,  
we utilise all  these aspects and  test  their  relationship with  the  stability  of  the  
financial  system  in  the  last  empirical  chapter.  While  the  literature  yields  
inconclusive results, we  find evidence that the banking competition in the Gulf  
region leads to a more fragile banking system. This in turn confirms the previous  
findings that perfect competition in GCC banking might not be the optimal case  
for consumer welfare.   
7. Structure of Thesis  
The remainder of the thesis is structured as shown in Table 1.1. Chapters 2 and  3  
provide  a  comprehensive  review  of  literature.  Chapter  2  of  the  banking  
competition review looks at the competition theories, methodologies and their  
applications in  the banking sector. Chapter 3 of  the competition policy review 
summarises the competition policy, laws and measures applied by competition  
and antitrust authorities worldwide. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are the three empirical  
investigations adhering  to  standard empirical  papers.  Chapter  4 examines  the  
market structure and the size-structure relationship of the GCC banking industry,  
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whereas Chapter 5 measures the degree of competition. Chapter 6 investigates  
the competition-financial stability relationship in the GCC banking sectors. The  
final  part  of  the  thesis,  Chapter  7,  concludes  with  overall  findings,  policy  
implications of results, and limitations of the study.   
Table 1.1. Structure of thesis  
Chapters Title of Chapters Contents of Chapters Chapter 1 Introduction Background of the 
topic,  motivations, aims and contributions 
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Chapter 4  
Measuring banking 
competition: A critical review 
of theories and 
methodologies  
Competition policy and its 
role in the  banking sector: An 
international  comparison  
A stochastic frontier approach 
to  modelling market 
structure in the  banking 
industry: An application to  
the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC)  
Review of competition 
theories,  methodologies and 
their   
applications in the banking 
sector.  
Review of competition policy, 
laws  and measures applied 
by   
competition authorities 
worldwide.  
Estimates of market structure 
and  size-structure 
relationship.  
Chapter 5 Banking competition of the GCC: 
The  tale of scale economies  
Chapter 6 Scale, competition, and financial  
stability in GCC banking  
Measurement of bank competition  using 
modified measure of  competition.  
Investigation of competition stability 
relationship in the GCC  banking markets. 
Chapter 7 Conclusion Main findings, policy implications,  limitations, and future 
directions. 
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Chapter 2. Measuring Banking Competition: A Critical Review of  
Theories and Methodologies  
1. Introduction  
In  recent  times,  the  world  economy  has  been  facing  persistently  low  growth,  
which  has  brought  more  universal  attention  to  competition  as  a  substantial  
driver  of  performance and  superb innovation in a  national economy. Hence, a  
driver  of  economic  growth  and  consumer  welfare.  Competition  in  the  
marketplace  will  foster  economic  growth  and  prosperity  by  promoting  the  
productivity of firms and industries, enhancing the competitiveness of domestic  
firms internationally (which will lead to higher export levels), and ensuring that  
lower-income  consumers  benefit  from  vibrant  economic  activity (Goodwin  &  
Martinez Licetti, 2016).  
This  recognition  of  competition  has  particular  significance  in  the  developing  
economies,  where  low  growth  has  been  threatening  development  and  shared  
prosperity. For instance, World Bank Group publications show that a substantial  
increase  of  competition  in Tunisia  is  estimated  to  have  increased  labour  
productivity growth by 5% in one year. Besides, it is  thought  that refining  the  
competition laws of sectors that restrict competition in Brazil, Kenya, Peru and  
South Africa could add 0.5% to their economic growth. It has also been found that  
intensifying competition in maize and sugar markets could decrease poverty by  
2% in Kenya (Goodwin & Martinez Licetti, 2016).   
Competition within banking, moreover, is a fundamental property of promoting  
three  main  aspects  of  this  sector:  efficiency,  access  to  finance,  and  systemic  
financial stability. The relationship between banking competition and these three  
aspects  has  been  explored  in  several  studies,  and  while  the  literature  yields  
mixed results, most research suggests that banking competition enriches banks’  
efficiency  and improves  access  to  credit  without  necessarily  undermining  the  
stability of the financial system. The context of the recent financial crisis has also  
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ignited  the  interest  of  academics  and  policy  makers  in  measuring  banking  
competition and reshaping competition policies (Boyd & De Nicoló, 2005; World  
Bank, 2012; Beck et al., 2013; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014; Kick & Prieto, 2015).  
The concept of market competition was  first introduced by Adam Smith in his  
classic work The Wealth of Nations. Smith (1776) used the term competition to  
represent the doctrine of free trade and laissez faire. According to the Smithian  
insight, free competition and trade without government intervention are vital to  
long-run equilibrium in any market. Smith viewed monopoly as the opposite of  
free  competition  and  used  it  to  denote  any  barrier  to  free  trade.  Inspired  
by  Smith, subsequent competition theories have been developed and contribute 
to  two major views of competition.   
On  the  one hand,  standard  theory refers  to competition as a  tranquil  or  static  
state of equilibrium in which rivals in the marketplace compete until equilibrium  
is  reached.  Once  such  equilibrium  holds  in  the  marketplace,  there  will  be  no  
further interaction between rivals and  the market will come  to rest. However,  
powerful critics shed new lights on viewing competition as a process of rivalry,  
and  emphasise  that  in  the  real  world,  productive  and  dynamic  efficiency  and  
attempts at innovation prevent  the market  from becoming static, and  that  this  
factor is neglected by the standard theory of competition (Vickers, 1995; Blaug,  
2001).   
The view of competition as a static state initiated with Cournot’s (1838/1897) 
and  Bertrand’s  (1883/1988) seminal  oligopoly  theories  and  extended  to  
conjectural  variation  theory (Bowley,  1924), monopolistic  competition  theory  
(Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933), Stackelberg’s (1934/2010)leader-follower  
model,  kinked  demand  theory  (Hall  &  Hitch,  1939;  Sweezy,  1939),  and  
tacit  collusion theory (Fellner, 1949; Stigler, 1964). A formal analysis was 
represented  by  game  theory  (Nash,  1950) and  repeated  game  theory  
(Friedman,  1971;  Aumann & Shapley, 1976; Rubinstein, 1979).  
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The  roots  of  the  dynamic  theories  of  competition  are  associated  with  the  
acknowledged leaders of the Austrian and Chicago Schools (Mises, 1949; Bork,  
1954; Telser, 1960; Shackle, 1971; Kirzner, 1973; Posner, 1979) as well as the  
insights of contestable markets theory (Baumol, 1982; Baumol et al., 1982) that  
led to what is now known as New Empirical Industrial Organisation (Pepall et al.,  
2008).   
In  the  academic  literature,  the  development  of  several  competition  theories  
made  the  notion  of  competition  appear  somewhat  complex  and  hence  not  
directly  observable.  As  a  result,  economists  and  scholars  have  developed  
numerous  methodologies  attempting  to  accurately  measure  competition  and  
market structure. In general, the academic literature on measuring competition  
is categorised into two main strands: structural approaches and non-structural  
approaches.  
The first strand, i.e. structural approaches, is based on the traditional Empirical  
Industrial  Organisation  (EIO).  Early  empirical  estimates  of  the  degree  of  
competition were based on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm  
and efficient-structure hypothesis. Formally,  these models are measured using  
various concentration ratios such as: market shares, k-bank concentration ratio  
(CRk) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). However, some authors have  
doubted  the  reliability  of  the  EIO  models  and  the  associated  measures  of  
competition (Shaffer, 2004b; Matthews et al., 2007).   
In response to the shortcomings found in structural approaches, a second strand  
of non-structural approaches emerged. Based on the New Empirical Organisation  
(NEIO) School, these approaches can be further divided into two major streams.  
The  first  generation  is  based  on  oligopoly  theory  and  a  static  model  of  
competition,  and  includes  the  Lerner  Index  (Lerner,  1934),  the  conjectural  
variation  model (Iwata,  1974),  the  Panzar-Rosse  H-statistic (Rosse  &  Panzar,  
1977;  Panzar  &  Rosse,  1982,  1987),  and  the  Bresnahan-Lau  mark-up  model  
(Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982). The second generation of competition measures  
aimed to capture the dynamics of the market rather than give a static analysis,  
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and includes  the  persistence  of  profits (Mueller,  1977,  1986),  the Hall-Roeger  
model  (Hall,  1988;  Roeger,  1995);  the  Boone  Indicator  (Boone,  2008);  the  
competition efficiency frontier (Bolt & Humphrey, 2010), and the lower bound to  
concentration approach (Tabacco, 2013).  
A search of the literature revealed few studies which provide a review of banking  
competition literature.  For instance,  Shaffer  (1983)  have  reviewed  three  non 
structural  approaches:  Iwata,  Bresnahan-Lau  and  Panzar-Rosse  models.  Also,  
Bikker and Haaf (2002b) have presented a detailed review of ten concentration  
measures  along  with  the  three  non-structural  approaches.  However,  none  of  
these  previous  studies  fully  assessed  the  banking  competition  literature  and  
combined  theories,  measures  and  their  application  to  the  banking  industry.  
Besides, research to date has not yet provided a comprehensive and up to date  
review of literature on banking competition. The present study fills this research  
gap  by  reviewing  a  range  of  academic  publications  which  deal  with  banking  
competition  and  provides  a  comprehensive  framework  that  combines  
competition  theories and methodologies  of measuring banking competition as  
well as their empirical applications to the banking sector.  
This study has three main aims. The first is to give a brief overview of competition  
theories developed over the years. The second aim is to provide a comprehensive  
and  critical  review  of  the  two  structural  approaches  and  nine  non-structural  
approaches  for  measuring  competition,  highlighting  their  key  strengths  and  
shortcomings. The third aim is to summarise the applications of these measures  
in the banking sectors of countries worldwide.  
Section 2 describes the systematic review process followed to produce this 
study.  Section 3 gives a brief overview of the development of competition 
theories since  the  18th century.  Sections  4  and  5  explain  in  detail  the  
structural  and  non structural  approaches  used  to  measure  competition,  with  
illustrations  of  the  strengths  and  drawbacks  of  each  one,  and  the  practical  
applications  in  the  banking sector. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study and 
suggests future trends. 
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Figure 2.1 below shows a  timeline  of competition  theories and methodologies  
applied to measure banking competition. 
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Measuring Competition in the Banking Industry  
Theoris of Competition  
Measures 
of Competition  
Originated by Adam Smith (1776) in The 
Wealth of Nations, inspired  others for 2 
main views of competition  
Structural Approaches  (EIO)  
Non-structural Approaches  (NEIO)  
Competition as a static state Cournot (1838) Oligopoly Theory:   
Competition as a dynamic  conception  
Non-formal  
Formal CRk  
1st generation   
(based on oligopoly  theory and a static   
2nd generation  
(Dynamic approach  of competition)  
Quantity-Competition Bertrand 
(1883) Oligopoly Theory:  Price-Competition  
The Austrian School led by  Schumpeter (1934, 1954),   Hayek (1941, 
1948), Mises   
(1949), Shackle (1971) &  Kirzner (1973)  
Market Power  (MP)   
Hypotheses SCP   
Efficient Structure  (ES) Hypotheses  
X  
HHI  
Market  shares  
model of competition)  
The Lerner Index Lerner (1934)  
Persistence of  Profits. Muller  (1977, 1986)  
Bertrand-Edgeworth Model  
Edgeworth (1897, 1925)   
Conjectural Variation  
Bowley (1924)   
Monopolistic Competition   
Chamberlin (1933)  
Robinson (1933)  
Stackelberg (1934)  leader  
follower model  
Kinked demand theory  
Sweezy (1939)  
Hall & Hitch (1939)  
Tacit Collusion  
Fellner (1949), Stigler (1964) Game Theory, Nash (1950)  
Repeated Game Theory   
Friedman (1971), Aumann & Shapley  (1976), Rubinsteibn (1979)  
The Chicago School led by  Director (1956), Bork  (1954), Bowman (1957),  
McGee (1958), Telser (1960) & Posner (1979)  
Contestable Market   
Theory  
Baumol (1982), Baumol et  al (1982)  
Post-Chicago or New  Industrial Organisation  
Paradig m   
Mason  (1939)  
Bain   
(1956)  
RMP   
theory  Sheph erd   
(1983)  
efficiency  (ESX)   
Demsetz (1973)  
Peltzman (1977)  
Scale  
efficien cy (ESS)  Lambso n  
(1987)  
Conjectural   
Variation   
Parameter.   
Iwata (1974)  
Panzar-Rosse  Model (1977)  
Bresnahan-Lau  (1982) Mark-up  Model  
Hall-Roeger Model  (1988, 1995)  
Boone Indicator  (2008)  
Competition   
Efficiency Frontier.  Bolt & Humphrey  (2010)  
Tobacco Approach  (2013) 
Figure 2.1. Methodologies of measuring banking competition Source: Author’s elaboration  
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2. Review Method  
The number of published studies on banking competition have an upward trend  
over  the  years  given the  significance  and  implication  of  the  topic.  Figure  
2.2 provides a summary  of  the  number  of  published  papers  since  1980 in 
Scopus  database.   
This  study  followed  the  systematic  review  process  proposed  by  Denyer  and  
Tranfield (2009). The review has focused mainly on published articles, books and  
book sections and excluded working papers. Also, the review of each competition  
measure included the first application of the measure in general and then only  
included  its  applications  in  the  banking  sector.  In  this  vein,  this  study  has  
analysed  a  total  of  268  references  of  which  84% is  journal  articles  that  were  
published between 1934 and 2017 in 85 journals (Table 2.1).   
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Figure 2.2.  The number of published papers on competition in banking (1980-
2017) Source: Scopus Database 
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Table 2.1. Distribution of articles by knowledge area and journal  
Journal   
Count Journal Title Article Count   
(1934 -2017)  
Economics, Econometrics and Statistics  
1 American Economic Review 10 2 Applied Economics 9 3 Economics Letters 9 4 Journal of Political 
Economy 7 5 Review of Industrial Organization 7 6 Journal of Law and Economics 4 7 RAND Journal 
of Economics 4 8 Review of Economics and Statistics 4 9 Econometrica 3 10 Empirical Economics 3 
11 International Journal of Industrial Organization 3  
12 Journal of Economics and Business 3 13 Journal of Industrial Economics 3 14 Quarterly Review 
of Economics and Finance 3 15 Applied Economics Letters 2 16 De Economist 2 17 Economic 
Journal 2 18 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 2 19 Oxford Economic Papers 2 
20 Quarterly Journal of Economics 2 21 Review of Economic Studies 2 22 Review of Financial 
Economics 2 23 Canadian Journal of Economics 1 24 Economic and Social Review 1 25 Economic 
Modelling 1 26 Economic Notes 1 27 Economic Systems 1 28 Economica 1 29 European Economic 
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Journal of Development Economics 1 37 Journal of Economic Literature 1 38 Journal of Economic 
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Journal of Financial Stability 3 8 Journal of International Money and Finance 3 9 International Review 
of Financial Analysis 2 10 Journal of Financial Intermediation 2  
11 Research in International Business and Finance 2 12 Review of Finance 2 13 European Journal of 
Finance 1 14 Finance Research Letters 1 15 Financial Management 1 16 Financial Markets, 
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19 Journal of Empirical Finance 1 20 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 1 21 Review of Quantitative 
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1 Northwestern University Law Review 1 2 The University of Chicago Law Review 1 3 The Yale 
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1 Emerging Markets Review 3 2 International Business Review 1 Operational Research & 
Management Science  
1 European Journal of Operational Research 1 2 Omega 1 Social Sciences  
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1 Regional Studies 1 Mathematics  
1 Annals of Mathematics 1 85 Total  224 
3. Competition in Economic Theory  
The concept of competition was first articulated by Adam Smith (1776). It was  
popularised  in  his  book  The  Wealth  of  Nations,  and  became  the  basis  of  the  
classical  treatment  of  competition.  The  well-known  Smithian  analysis  of  
‘invisible  hand’  principles  considers  free  trade  and  competition  as  significant  
mechanisms to market equilibrium in the long-run. The condition of free trade  
and  competition  without  government  intervention,  as  if  by  an  invisible  hand,  
would  automatically  motivate  market  systems  to  focus  on  manufacturing  
products to serve the nation’s most important needs at prices equal to the costs  
of production. Smith (1776) also argued that subsides, monopolies, tariff walls,  
controls and other privileges that producers enjoy from government authorities  
threaten  free  competition  and  trade  and  are  detrimental.    For  these  reasons,   
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Smith  believed  that  the  role  of  government  in  society  should  focus  on  core  
functions such as maintaining defence, order, infrastructure and education, while  
keeping the market and economy open and free to avoid any distortion.  
Inspired by Smith, several further models and theories of competition have been  
proposed which contribute towards two major views of competition. On the one  
hand,  standard  theory  refers  to  competition  as  tranquil  or  static  equilibrium  
state in which well-informed firms treat prices parametrically and are not able  to 
over-charge and thus make unusually high profits. Under these theories, rivals  in 
the marketplace will compete until equilibrium is reached. Once equilibrium  
holds in the market, there will be no further interactions between rivals and the  
market will come to rest. On the other hand, powerful criticisms shed new light  
on  viewing  competition  as  a  process  of  rivalry  highlighting  the importance  
of  dynamic efficiency and innovation that are neglected in the standard theory of  
competition.  In  the  real  world,  efficiency  and  innovation  attempts  by  market  
participants  do  not  rest long  enough  for  a  static  state  to  hold (Vickers,  1995;  
Blaug, 2001).   
3.1. Static Theories of Competition  
Market competitive extremes refers to either monopoly or perfect competition.  
In both cases, firms do not have to worry about other firms’ actions and decisions.  
In a monopolistic market, there are no other firms, while in perfectly competitive  
market  there are  other  firms  but  the  decisions  of  one  firm  have  no effects  
on  other firms. This is because every firm possesses a very small market share 
and  therefore the decisions of that firm would not have any effects on other firms 
in  perfectly competitive market. In the real world, however, the majority of firms  
and corporations are neither monopolists nor perfect competitors and live in the  
middle ground of oligopoly where rivals interact strategically to survive (Pepall  
et al., 2008).   
The first precise analytical treatment of static oligopoly models in the literature  
was  pioneered  by  the  French  mathematician  Augustin  Cournot  in  the  19th 
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century.  Cournot  (1838/1897) initially    examined  a  monopolistic  type  of   
markets and then proceeded to the opposite extreme of competitive equilibrium,  
which led him to recognise a stage in between, in which a market consists of more  
than one firm, but not a large number of them. The basic story behind the Cournot  
model is that a single firm is profitably able to enter a market currently supplied  
by  a  monopolist,  if  certain  assumptions  are  maintained.  The  entrant  firm  is  
assumed  to  produce  identical  products  and  at  the  same  unit  cost  of  the  
incumbent monopolist as well as free entry and exit conditions in the market. The  
entrant firm will choose the level of profit-maximising output while taking into  
account  the output level being sold by  the monopolist. The  former monopolist  
will hence react and adjust the level of output given the output sold by the new  
rival firm. The process of choosing the level of output according to that of other  
firms can be repeated, and represents what Cournot (1838/1897) referred to as  
reaction curves.  
In the Cournot model, the equilibrium market price that will arise upon the firm’s  
choice  of  production  level  is  less  than  that  of  a  pure  monopoly,  yet  the  
equilibrium  price  is  greater  than  what  would  prevail in  a  purely  competitive  
market. Thus, the Cournot (1838/1897) oligopoly theory considers the quantity  
of output as the firm’s choice or strategic variable when they compete. Although  
the Cournot model went largely unrecognised for about a hundred years after its  
publication,  it  is  now  considered  as  a  cornerstone  of  modern  industrial  
organisation theory.  
Fifty  years  later,  another  influential  French  mathematician,  Joseph  Bertrand,  
introduced  the  first  famous  critique  to  the  Cournot  oligopoly  models.  In  
reviewing  Cournot,  Bertrand  (1883/1988) argued  that  firms  will  definitely  
collude  to  gain larger  profits  than the  Cournot  equilibrium. Moreover,  even if  
firms choose not to collude, they would choose the prices rather than the quantity  
of produced output. In a situation where firms produce a homogenous output in  
an oligopolistic market, consumers prefer to buy from the cheapest source. For  
this reason, it is more reasonable to consider firms as price choosers rather than  
quantity choosers (Shapiro, 1989). 
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The legacy of Bertrand (1883/1988) is recognising the difference between the  
strategic  variables on which  firms  compete. According  to  the Bertrand model,  
firms  will  choose  and  compete  at  the  level  of  price  rather  than  quantity,  
and  consumers will always choose to buy from the lowest price firm. The 
Bertrand  oligopoly theory also assumes that firms are willing and able to supply 
all market  demand.  Therefore,  any  deviation  in  price  level  between  rivals  
will  cause  an  immediate and comprehensive loss of demand for the firm offering 
higher prices.  This gives an incentive to firms to lower their prices in order to 
capture the whole  market.  The  only  Bertrand  equilibrium  price  is  then  the  
price  sets  equal  to  marginal  cost  for  equally  efficient  firms  with  constant  
marginal  cost  and  homogenous products. This is in contrast to Cournot 
competition in which prices  remain substantially above marginal cost as long as 
the number of firms is not  large. (Shapiro, 1989; Pepall et al., 2008).  
Bertrand’s  criticism  of  the  Cournot model was  further elaborated  by  the  Irish  
philosopher and economist Francis Edgeworth in 1897. Since the original English  
version  of  Edgeworth’s  model  of  1897  was  lost,  the  Italian  version  has  been  
retranslated into English by Edgeworth (1925). One of Edgeworth’s criticisms of  
the Bertrand model was the assumption that firms possess an unlimited capacity  
for production. While Bertrand’s analysis of oligopoly markets assumes that the  
only equilibrium for profit-maximising firms with constant marginal cost is the  
price  that  equals  marginal  cost  and  thus  firms  earn  zero  profits,  Edgeworth  
(1925) disagreed for two sound reasons. The first is that rival firms are subject  
to capacity constraints and are thus unable to serve all consumers in the market.  
The second reason is that consumers may not view the products of the firms as  
perfect  substitutes.  When  introducing  capacity  constraints  to  the  Bertrand  
model,  Edgeworth  showed  that  a  pure  strategy  equilibrium will  not  generally  
exist (Dudey, 1992). In the Bertrand-Edgeworth model there is no pure strategy  
equilibrium and firms play a mixed strategy where prices vary cyclically between  
low and high (Waldman & Jensen, 2016). 
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Bowley’s (1924) introduction of conjectural variations in oligopoly theory adds  
to the Cournot and Bertrand models. The basic idea is the belief that one firm’s  
choice  of  output  (price)  level  in  an  oligopolistic  market  will  affect  the  rivals’  
choice  of  output  (price)  level.  This  belief  is  in  contrast  to  the  Cournot  and  
Bertrand model where oligopolistic firms make their choices independently from  
rivals’ reactions to their choices. The reactions of rivals to one  firm’s choice of  
either price or quantity is subjectively conjectured by the choice-making firm and  
hence are called conjectural variations. Those reactions are taken into account  
and influence  the  firm’s decision when choosing  the level of profit-maximising  
quantity  (price).  Despite  the  fact  that  this  theory  might  refer  to  a  dynamic  
phenomenon, the analysis is a static one (Bowley, 1924; Dockner, 1992).   
An admirable reconciliation to the Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly theories was  
developed almost  simultaneously  by  the American economist  Chamberlin and  
the British economist Robinson in the year 1933.  The starting point of this new  
departure  in  theory  is  that  many  real-world  firms  operate  under  mixed  
conditions  of  both  market  extremes,  monopoly  and  perfect  competition.  
Therefore, an intermediate case in market structure is identified as monopolistic  
competition.  Under  monopolistic  competition,  there  are  as  many  firms  as  in  
competition, however, with differentiated products, which are not identical but  
rather very close substitutes. Also, each firm names its own prices in the market.  
In  line  with  Cournot’s  and  Bertrand’s  oligopoly  theories,  the  monopolistic  
competition  theory  of  Chamberlin  and  Robinson  assumes  that  decisions  and  
choices  of  one  firm  have  no  noticeable  effect  on  other  firms  in  the  market  
(Chamberlin, 1933; Robinson, 1933; Friedman, 1982).   
A  step  forward  in  economic  theory  was  proposed  in  1934  by  the  German  
economist Stackelberg. The duopoly model of Stackelberg (1934/2010)is similar  
to the Cournot model but is distinguished by a critical difference. According to  
Stackelberg,  both  firms are  quantity  choosers,  however  the  choice  of  quantity  
level is conducted sequentially rather than simultaneously. The main feature of  
the  Stackelberg  model  is  the  underlying  assumption  of  sequential  moves.  
Stackelberg (1934/2010) thus defined  two  forms of behaviour, a leader and a  
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follower. The firm that moves first and chooses its level of output is the leader  
firm, whereas the firm that moves second is the follower firm. In comparison to  
the  Cournot  equilibrium,  the  Stackelberg  leader-follower  equilibrium  yields  
greater industry output and lower equilibrium prices. Although sequential choice  
of output can be well-thought-out as a dynamic game, the analysis remains static.  
The firms are assumed to interact only once and their interaction yields a once  
and-for-all  market-clearing  outcome  (Stackelberg,  1934/2010;  Pepall  et  al.,  
2008).  
Sweezy (1939), like Stackelberg, presented a special pattern of firms’ behaviour  
and  introduced  the  kinked  demand  theory  in  oligopolistic  markets.  
Independently  and  almost  simultaneously,  Hall  and  Hitch  (1939) published  
similar ideas and included more rigorous empirical testing. In the kinked demand  
theory, oligopolistic firms are presumed to react differently to price changes by  
one firm in the market depending on the direction of the change. On the one hand,  
an increase in one firm’s prices will be ignored by the rivals and their prices will  
remain constant. On the other hand, if an oligopolistic firm decides to decrease  
its  prices  then  other  firms  would  react  and  decrease  their  prices  by  an  equal  
amount. This form of presumed behaviour produces a “kink” in the demand curve  
of  an  oligopolistic  producer  at  the  existing  price.  In  other  words,  rivals  in  
oligopoly markets will  quickly  respond  to match  price  reductions  but will  not  
react  to  price  increases.  The  underlying  expectations  of  firms’  behaviour  
extinguishes  the motivation  to  change  prices.  The  kinked  demand  theory was  
thus  an  initial  attempt  to  explain  sticky  prices  under  oligopolistic  market  
conditions (Hall & Hitch, 1939; Sweezy, 1939; Stigler, 1947).  
Oligopoly theories and models developed in the literature stirred the anxiety of  
economists regarding the stability of equilibria and the tendency of oligopolists  
to collude. This endorsed  the  tacit collusion view of Fellner (1949) and Stigler  
(1964). The tacit collusion theory proposes that firms in an oligopolistic market  
tend to collude in order to earn maximised joint profits. The level of collusion will  
depend, however, upon the entry and exit conditions in the market as well as the  
elasticity of demand. 
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In his influential book, Competition Among the Few, Fellner (1949) challenged the  
usual  analysis  of  supply  and  demand  in  an  oligopolistic  market  with  a  small  
number  of  competitors.  This  challenge  stemmed  from  the  fact  that  the  
interdependence  of  actions  and  the  indeterminateness  of  prices  had  hitherto  
largely been ignored. Fellner (1949) also shed light on two main criticisms of the  
Cournot model. The  first criticism is that Cournot was right, but  for the wrong  
reasons,  since  the  stability  property makes  no  sense.  In  the  Cournot  analysis,  
firms  would  be  able  to  correctly  predict  their  rivals’  behaviour  and  optimise  
accordingly. Firms will also assume that rivals’ choice of output will remain the  
same once an equilibrium solution has been reached. Fellner (1949), however,  
strongly rejected this idea and proposed that firms would realise, while they are  
in  the  adjustment  process  toward  equilibrium,  that  their expectations  are  
systematically falsified by evidence and that rivals would constantly change their  
output level. Therefore, only at equilibrium level are  the expectations of  firms  
correct, and once they notice the instability of their rivals’ choice, there will be a  
deviation  from this equilibrium. The second criticism is that in an oligopolistic  
situation with a small number of  firms there will be a strong tendency toward  
collusion. This is a natural phenomenon since the main objective of firms is profit 
maximisation (Fellner, 1949; Vives, 1989, 2001; Gangopadhyay, 2010).   
Stigler (1964) adds to Fellner’s argument by stating that secret price cutting by  
some firms is the major obstacle to the stability of collusive agreements. When a  
firm observes lower levels of sales, it cannot definitely determine whether it is  
because of an adverse shock in demand or whether some rivals are cheating on  
the  cartel  agreement.  These  criticisms  emphasise  that  Cournot’s  static  
equilibrium is not  valid in a dynamic setting and is a useful notion only when  
representing  the  endpoint  of  a  dynamic  process.  However,  the  tacit  collusion  
theory  lacks  the  formal  analysis  of  a  static  Cournot  solution  concept  under  
dynamic settings (Vives, 1989, 2001; Gangopadhyay, 2010).  
In  the  mid-20th  century,  an  innovative  branch  of  social  science  emerged  in  
economic  theory  literature,  namely  game  theory.  Game  theory  represents  
the  
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first  formal  analysis  and  modelling  of  decisions  undertaken  in  an  interactive  
setting, that is, so-called strategic decisions. A non-surprising aftermath then is  
that  game  theory  and  oligopoly  studies  are  closely  intertwined.  The  unit  of  
analysis  divides  game  theory  into  two  branches:  non-cooperative  and  
cooperative.  The  individual  player  (firm)  is  the  unit  of  analysis  in  non  
cooperative games, whereas a group or coalition of players (firms) is the unit of  
analysis  in  cooperative  games.  The  underlying  application  of  game  theory  to  
oligopoly  requires  the  satisfaction  of  two  basic  assumptions.  First,  firms  are  
rational  and  pursue  well-defined  objectives,  mainly  profit  maximisation.  
Secondly, firms apply their rationality in the process of reasoning strategically.  
This holds when firms utilise all knowledge to anticipate other firms’ behaviour.   
In game theory, each firms’ actions and decisions are referred to as a strategy. A  
list  of  the  strategic  choices  available  for  each  particular  player  is  termed  a  
strategy combination that defines the outcome or final gain of the game. In the  
context  of  oligopoly,  the  game  payoff  is  typically  the  firms’  profits.  The  
equilibrium strategy outcome is the strategy combination where no firm has an  
incentive to change its strategy given that no other players in the market want to  
change  their  strategies.  Once  such  equilibrium  strategy  outcome  holds, it  will  
remain unaltered and the game (market) will come to rest. This type of game in  
a single period is a static one as firms meet once only and the market then clears  
once-and-for-all. There are neither sequential moves over time nor repetition of  
interactions (Nash, 1950, 1951, 1953; Rasmusen, 2007; Pepall et al., 2008).  
Nobel  laureate  John  Nash  developed  this  notion  of  an  equilibrium  strategy  
combination for a non-cooperative game. In his honour, it is commonly referred  
to as the Nash equilibrium concept. The well-known oligopoly models of Cournot  
and  Bertrand,  although  developed  in  the  late  nineteenth  century,  incorporate  
modern game  theoretic elements. Cournot’s oligopoly equilibrium  for a single  
period quantity model is an extraordinary early example of a non-cooperative  
game and can be referred to as a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The same settings  
apply  to  the  Bertrand  oligopoly  price  model  and  Stackelberg  leader  model.  
Consequently, the equilibrium solutions of those models are the Bertrand-Nash  
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equilibrium  and  Stackelberg-Nash  equilibrium (Friedman,  1982;  Pepall  et  
al.,  2008).   
Game theory has inspired other economists to develop further economic models. 
This  is  exemplified  in  the  pioneering  work  of  Friedman (1971),  Aumann  and  
Shapley (1976),  and  Rubinstein (1979) in  the  theory  of  repeated  games.  The  
main motivation behind this theory is that departing from a static-single period  
game  to a  repeated  one provides  strong incentive  for  firms  to participate in a  
cooperative-cartel  behaviour  that  would  sound  dramatically  more  profitable.  
Although departing from the cartel agreement is profitable in the short run (one  
period), the gain will be offset by losses every period thereafter. The theory of  
repeated game, hence, supports the  tacit collusion  view and  formally analyses  
the mechanisms to sustain cartels using threats that are credible (Vives, 2001;  
Pepall et al., 2008). This theory provides an appropriate tool to analyse dynamic  
interactions rather than single-period interaction; nevertheless, it is referred to  
as a dynamic analysis of static competition (Audretsch et al., 2001).  
The neoclassical concept of competition stems from oligopoly theory. Oligopoly  
theory classifies the market structure into different categories starting from the  
collusive extreme, passing by intermediate cases of imperfect competition, and  
finally reaching the perfect competitive extreme. Oligopoly theory thus inspired  
economists to derive testable hypotheses and to develop measures of the degree  
of competition. As a result, the economic literature includes various approaches  
to  gauge  the  degree  of  competitiveness.  Structural  approaches  and  the  early  
generation of non-structural approaches of measuring competition are based on  
oligopoly theory and the neoclassical concept of competition (Liu et al., 2013).  
Yet, several critiques have been oriented to the static oligopoly theories and the  
neoclassical conception of competition (Vives, 2001). The main challenge is the  
contradictory view of competition that focuses on dynamic aspects. The dynamic  
view of competition refers to competition as being a complex process of rivalry  
rather than a static concept, and this is discussed in the next section. 
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3.2. Dynamic Theories of Competition  
A controversial view of market structure and competition models questions the  
usefulness  of  neoclassical  ideas  of  competition  as  a static  state  and  their  
applicability to real world markets. The roots of dynamic models of competition  
are  associated  with  the  acknowledged  leaders  of  the  Austrian  School  of  
Economics, mainly the early work of Mises, Schumpeter and Hayek as well as a  
more recent  work  of  Demsetz,  Shackle  and  Kirzner (Audretsch  et  al.,  2001).   
Principal  relevant  work  includes,  among  others,  Schumpeter  (1934,  1954),  
Hayek (1941, 1948), Mises (1949), Shackle (1971) and  Kirzner (1973).   
The  main  argument  of  the  Austrian  School  economists  toward  the  traditional  
theories of market competition is the application of competition to a static state  
of affairs rather than to a process of rivalry. A serious criticism of much of the  
Austrian School literature on static competition models is that their main focus  is  
about  the  endpoint  of  the  market,  given  some  initial  conditions,  after  the  
competitors’  interactions  have  ceased.  However,  they  fail  to  explain  how  the  
market would arrive at this point. In the real world, ongoing entrepreneurship  
and innovation never stay still long enough for static conditions to hold (Kirzner,  
1997; Rosen, 1997; Audretsch et al., 2001). Hébert and Link (1988) add to this  
argument and further emphasise that static economic theory neglects the role of  
entrepreneurial innovative actions.   
The static economic theories also consider technology and market demand as set,  
leaving  price  or  output  levels  as  the  only  variables  that  firms  are  able  to  
determine for themselves. The Austrian economists, for example Shackle (1971) 
and Kirzner (1973), harshly criticise such assumptions and argue that in reality  
firms constantly seek out and move towards innovation with the aim of gaining  
competitive  advantage  over  rivals.  Successful  entrepreneurs  with  innovative  
products  would  enjoy  static  market  power  and  earn  temporary  monopoly  
profits; yet  this kind of competitive advantage will eventually be destroyed by  
existing rival companies who will imitate the innovation or produce a superior  
one Moreover, the few barriers of entry and exit in the industry can also eliminate  
permanent  competitive  advantage  for  successful  firms.  The  prospect  of  high  
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profits will motivate new competitors to enter the market until economic profits  
are normalised (Darity & Williams, 1985; Rosen, 1997; Audretsch et al., 2001).   
The  Austrian  prescription  for  policymakers  is  that  competition  authorities  
should not intervene and impose antitrust regulations if the market enjoys trivial  
entry barriers. Such intervention  to reduce  the profits of a successful  firm will  
destroy its incentives to innovate. The only case in which competition authorities  
should  establish  regulations  and  prevent  antitrust  behaviour  is  where  an  
incumbent  firm  in  the  market  has  high  monopoly  power  but  low  levels  of  
innovation.  Even  in  this  case,  the  Austrian  prescription  suggests  that  the  
intervention of competition authorities is still not really necessary, since the lure  
of high profits will attract new competitors to the market who will defend their  
entry with the weapon of innovation (Hayek, 1941, 1948; Mises, 1949; Shackle,  
1971; Kirzner, 1973, 1997; Audretsch et al., 2001).   
The thoughts of the Austrian School economists were revived by Chicago School  
leaders. The key ideas of the Chicago School antitrust analysis were formulated  
by  Aaron  Director  in  the  1950s  and  published  formally  in  Director  and  Levi  
(1956).  The  key  ideas  of  Director  were  further  elaborated  by  lawyers  and  
economists from the school such as Bork (1954), Bowman (1957), McGee (1958),  
Telser  (1960) and  Posner  (1979).  The  Chicago  view  of  market  competition  
stresses that contestable markets need to be left without regulations as market  
mechanisms  will  naturally  abolish  any  market  power  and  monopoly  profits.  
Chicago School economists argue  that  firms’ actions  toward achieving positive  
profits  that  are  viewed  as  harmful  to  competition  are  actually  improving  
economic efficiency and increasing consumer welfare. The presence of positive  
profits in a contestable market will then motivate the entry of new competitors  
until  profits  cease.  Most  markets  will  thus  eventually  reach  the  desirable  
competitive equilibrium without any regulation intervention.   
Both the Austrian School and the Chicago School antitrust analysis shed the light  
on  a  laissez  faire approach  to  regulation.  This  view  is  likewise  supported  by  
Baumol (1982) as  well  as  Baumol et  al. (1982) in  the  well-known  theory  of  
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contestable  markets.  In  line  with  the  Austrian  and  Chicago  Schools,  Baumol  
(1982) and  Baumol  et  al.  (1982) defend  monopolisation  and  highlight  the  
importance of entry threat on restraining any monopoly power, which will lead  
to  achieving  an  eventual  maximum  social  welfare.  The  contestability  theory  
shows that the incumbent firm is under high competitive pressure from potential  
rivals who would effortlessly enter the market as long as there are no sunk costs  
(entry barriers). In perfectly contestable markets, with no barrier to entry and  
exit, the threat of new entrants will thus discourage any intention of monopoly  
firms to raise prices.   
Subsequently,  the conclusions  of  the  Austrian  School,  Chicago  School  and  the  
contestability theory have been criticised by several economists. A key critique  is  
questioning  the  ability  of  new  entrants  to  compete  effectively.  Another  key  
critique  doubts  the  common  assumption  of  Austrian  economists  that  
entrepreneurial  innovative  activity,  which  includes  increased  costs  and  risk  
taking,  is  always  welfare-enhancing.  Nevertheless,  a  significant  portion  of  
Austrian  thinking  is  the  main  root  of  the  new  industrial  economics  that  
incorporates  dynamics  and  proceeds  beyond  the  confines  of  static  models  
(Audretsch et al.,  2001). The  Chicago School  contributions also are  difficult  to  
underestimate, and their legal influence has spread over many antitrust policies.  
As a result,  the  field of industrial organisation has been  transformed  to reflect  
what some call ‘post-Chicago’, or what others simply refer to as New Industrial  
Organisation (Pepall et al., 2008).   
New  industrial  economics focuses  mainly  on  firms’  behaviour  in  terms  of  
strategy  and  conduct  rather  than  market  structure.  According  to  the  new  
industrial  economics,  the  dilemma  for  competition  policy  is  that  government  
intervention is necessary depending upon the firm’s strategy or behaviour. The  
influence  can  be  obviously  seen  in  the  current  antitrust  policies  and  mergers  
guidelines  in  many  countries  around  the  world  including,  among  others,  the  
United  States  (US),  the  United  Kingdom  (UK)  and  the  European  Union  (EU)  
countries (Pepall et al., 2008).  
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The  competition  models,  theories  and  views  developed  in  the  economic  
literature  inspired  scholars  and  economists  to  construct  measures  of  
competition and market structure. The measures of competition applied in the  
banking  sector  are  classified  into  two  main  categories:  structural  and  non  
structural.  
4. Structural Approaches (EIO Theory)  
The structural approaches to competition intensity measurement are based on  
traditional empirical industrial organisation theory. The term ‘structural’ stems  
from the explicit use of market structure to measure the degree of competition.  
Structural approaches consider market structure as an exogenous variable, and  
typically regress the profitability of  firms on a measure of concentration and a  
number of control variables. Positive relationship indicates firms’ exploitation of  
market  competition  and  a  lack  of  competition (Matthews  et  al.,  2007).  In  the  
economics  literature,  structural  approaches  are  introduced  informally  in  the  
form  of  theories  and  hypotheses,  and  formally  through  the  measures  of  
concentration (Bikker & Haaf, 2002b).   
4.1. Non-formal Approaches  
A theoretical basis for a systematic connotation between firms’ profitability and  
measures of market structure, either concentration or market shares, arises from  
two market power (MP) hypotheses and two efficient-structure (ES) hypotheses  
with roots in the traditional empirical industrial organisation (EIO) theory.   
The  market  power  hypotheses  include  two  related  theories.  The  Structure 
Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm of Mason (1939) and Bain (1956) predicts  
a  positive  relationship  between  market  structure  and  firms’  performance.  
According to the SCP theory, this prediction reflects the setting of collusive prices  
that are less favourable to consumers (lower deposit rates, higher loan rates) as  
a  result  of  competitive  imperfections  in  highly  concentrated  markets.  Market  
concentration would  then  enable  the  exploitation  of  firms’ market  power  and  
ease  collusive  agreements  to  set  higher  prices  and  hence  enjoy  higher  
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profitability (Mason,  1939;  Bain,  1956;  Shaffer,  2004).  A  related  theory is  the  
Relative-Market-Power  (RMP)  hypothesis,  which  argues  that  only  firms  with  
large market shares and well-differentiated products are able to exercise market  
power in pricing and earn monopoly profits (Shepherd, 1983).  
In  contrast  to  the  two  MP  theories,  two  efficiency  explanations  of  the  profit 
structure  positive  relationship  emerge  from  the  ES  hypothesis.  The  Efficient 
Structure (ES) hypothesis demonstrates that this positive relationship is defined  
by the efficiency level of a firm. Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) claim that  
firms  with  creative  management  and/or  superior  production  technologies  
usually incur lower costs and are therefore able to generate higher profitability  
compared to their inefficient counterparts. The ES hypothesis has usually been  
proposed  in  the  literature  in  two  versions  postulating  similar  ideas.  The  X 
efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypothesis (ESX) proposes that firms  
with  higher  efficiency  have  lower  costs  and  will  enjoy  higher  profits,  thus  
generating a larger market share which may result in high concentration levels  
due to superior management and technology (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977).  
The Scale-Efficiency version of the efficient-structure hypothesis (ESS) suggests  
that firms have equivalently good management and technologies; however, some  
firms  are  more  scale-efficient  and  would  produce  the  output  closer  to  the  
minimum average cost point. Such scale-efficient firms are assumed to have large  
market  shares  that  would  result  in  high  levels  of  market  concentration.  Both  
hypotheses  shed  light  on  efficiency  as  the  main  driver  of  profits  and  market  
structure, and point to the falsity of the direct positive correlation between firms’  
profits  and  market  concentration  as  illustrated  by  the  two  MP  hypotheses  
(Lambson, 1987; Berger, 1995; Al-Muharrami & Matthews, 2009).  
There is a large volume of published studies testing the market-power (MP) and  
efficient-structure  (ES)  hypotheses  in  the  banking  industry  worldwide.  
Some  studies  have  tested  the  MP  hypotheses  alone  by  examining  the  price 
concentration association. Reviews of such empirical investigations are 
provided  by  Rhoades  (1982),  Gilbert  (1984) and  Weiss (1989).  While  the  
literature  of  concentration-price relationship in the banking industry supports 
the SCP theory  
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in many cases (Berger & Hannan, 1989; Hannan & Berger, 1991; Bikker & Haaf,  
2002;  Pilloff  &  Rhoades,  2002;  Al-Muharrami  &  Matthews,  2009),  published  
results have been mixed.   
Pricing  conduct  has  often  shown  no  significant  relationship  with  market  
concentration,  even  in  the  earliest  studies  (Flechsig,  1965;  Meyer,  1967).  
Rhoades (1982) expresses doubts in the overall ability to link concentration and  
performance. In a similar model, a comprehensive review of 47 datasets by Weiss  
(1989) showed that a significant positive association between loan interest rates  
and market concentration existed in only 45% of the sample reviewed. Similarly,  
Petersen and Rajan (1995) note that posted interest rates on bank loans are less  
expensive for new and credit-constrained firms in concentrated banking markets  
than in unconcentrated banking markets. Less robust evidence and criticisms for  
the positive correlation between market structure and banks’ performance have  
also  been  embodied  by  several  lines  of  empirical  research  in  the  literature  
(Jackson, 1992; Rhoades, 1995; Hannan, 1997; Santomero, 1999).  
Historically,  research  investigating  the  positive  profit-structure  relationship  
have been unable to distinguish among the MP and ES hypotheses, as efficiency  
was  not  directly  measured.  Early  examples  of  research  into  ES  hypotheses  
regress  the profitability of a  firm on concentration and market shares. Similar  
results  have  been  found, however  with  very  different interpretations because  
efficiency variables, mainly X-efficiency or scale-efficiency, were excluded from  
the analysis. Some authors argue that a result of positive-significant coefficient  
estimate  of  market  share  and  an  insignificant  coefficient  of  concentration  
supports  the RMP  theory  that relates market share  to market power (Kurtz &  
Rhoades,  1992;  Rhoades,  1985;  Shepherd,  1986a,  1986b).  Other  authors  
conversely argue that this finding validates the ESX hypothesis, since there is a  
possible positive relationship between market shares and X-efficiency under the  
ESX hypothesis even with the absence of any direct X-efficiency measure in the  
equation (Smirlock et al., 1984, 1986; Smirlock, 1985; Evanoff & Fortier, 1988).  
In  the  same  vein,  studies  supporting  the  ESS  hypothesis,  under  which  scale 
efficiencies  are  positively  related  to  profits  and  market  shares,  assume  that  
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market share may pick up the correlation with excluded scale-efficiency (Gale &  
Branch, 1982;  Smirlock et al., 1984; Stevens, 1990).   
A  seminal  study  by Berger  (1995) tested  the  two  MP  and  two  ES  hypotheses  
together and was the first to add direct measures of both X-inefficiency and scale  
efficiency to the empirical analysis. Despite the limited support found for the ESX  
and  RMP  theories,  Berger  (1995) concludes  that  all  four  hypotheses  do  not  
appear  to be of great importance in explaining banks’ profits as efficiency and  
market power tend to explain relatively small variance of firms’ profitability. A  
more recent study by Homma, Tsutsui, and Uchida (2014) has proposed a new  
test  for  the  ES  hypothesis  that  directly  examines  firms’  efficiency-growth  
relationship. Consistent with  the ES hypothesis, more efficient  Japanese banks  
seem to defeat competition and grow as a result, obtaining larger market shares.   
4.2. Formal Approaches  
Numerous empirical investigation  of  structural  competition models  have  used  
measures of concentration as a proxy to capture structural features of the market  
and to explain competitive performance in the banking industry (A. Berger et al.,  
2004; Beck et al., 2006; Alegria & Schaeck, 2008). According to Hall and Tideman  
(1967), concentration measures should be a one-dimensional measure ranging  
between zero and one and be independent of  the size of  the industry. Marfels  
(1971), in  addition,  differentiates  between  four  classification  of  concentration  
measures  according  to  their  weighting  schemes  and  structure.  The  first  
classification is  the weights of unity and zero attached  to banks in  the market  
based  on  their  market  shares.  A  weight  of  one  is  attached  to  an arbitrarily  
determined number of banks ranked in descending order, whereas a weight of  
zero is attached to the remaining banks in the industry. The second classification  
uses the market share of a bank as its weight, thus allowing greater weights to  
larger banks. The ranking of individual banks, either descending or ascending,  
are  used  as  their  own  weight  in  the  third  classification.  Finally,  some  
concentration measures weight each bank by using the negative logarithm of its  
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market  shares.  This  classification  therefore  gives  a  smaller  absolute  value  
to  banks with larger market shares.   
Surveying the literature in this field, several concentration measures have been  
used to capture the degree of competitiveness in many banking markets, such as:  
number of banks, k-bank concentration ratio (CRk), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
(HHI),  Hall-Tideman  Index  (HTI),  Rosenbluth  Index  (RI),  Comprehensive  
Industrial Concentration Index (CCI), Hannah and Kay Index (HKI), the U Index  
(U), multiplicative Hause  Index  (Hm), addictive Hause  Index  (Ha), and Entropy  
measure  (E) (Bikker  &  Haaf,  2002b)1.  According  to  73  US  Structure-Conduct 
Performance (SCP) studies in banking, the most frequently applied concentration  
measure  is  the  k-bank  concentration  ratio,  and  particularly  the  3-bank  
concentration ratio, followed by HHI and the number of banks (Phil Molyneux et  
al., 1994). Simplicity and limited data requirements are salient features of both  
k-bank concentration ratio and the HHI. Therefore, these measures only will be  
explained in detail.   
The k-bank concentration (!"!) ratio can be simply measured by summing the  
market shares of k banks in the market. Algebraically, it is measured as: !  
!"! = &'("  
"#$  
where MS is the market share of the ith bank and k is the number of the largest  
banks included in the calculations of the ratio. The index values range between  
zero and unity. Zero value of  the index indicates an infinite number of equally  
sized banks, while unity is reached if the entire market is made up of the banks  
included in the calculations of the ratio. A distinguishable aspect of the !"! index  
is that it does not discriminate between the k leading banks. However, it neglects  
other smaller banks in the market and the decision of determining the value of k 
is somewhat arbitrary (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; Bikker & Spierdijk, 2010).  
1 Bikker and Haaf (2002b) provide detailed information on the calculation and interpretation of  
the mentioned measures of concentration. 
38  
Herfindahl (1950) and Hirschmam (1964) developed the Herfindahl-Hirschman  
Index  (HHI)  independently. The  HHI  Index  has  been  the  basis  of  merger  
guidelines in the US Department of Justice since 1982 and is widely used by bank  
regulatory agencies. The HHI is a static measure of concentration at a single point  
of time and is calculated by squaring the market share of each bank in a particular  
banking market and then summing the squares, as follows:  
&  
))* = &('(")%  
"#$  
As mentioned above, MS refers to the market share of the ith firm, while n refers  
to the number of firms in the market. The HHI values can range from zero in a  
market with an endless number of banks, to 10,000 in a market with only one  
firm.  According  to  the  2010  Horizontal  Merger  Guidelines,  the  markets  are  
classified into  three  types: unconcentrated markets  (HHI < 1500); moderately  
concentrated markets  (1500  < HHI  <  2500); and  highly  concentrated markets  
(HHI  >  2500).  In  general,  mergers  in  a  moderately  and  highly  concentrated  
market  involving  an  increase  in  the  HHI  >  100  points  are  likely  to  raise  
substantial competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny (U.S. Department of  
Justice  and  The  Federal  Trade  Commission, 2010). Unlike  the  k-bank  
concentration  ratio,  the  HHI  incorporates  all  banks  in  the  market  and  thus  
arbitrary decisions are avoided. However, it discriminates between banks as it  
assigns greater weight to larger banks in the market (Matthews et al., 2007; Al 
Muharrami, 2008; Daley & Matthews, 2012).  
In  the  same  vein,  Sutton (1991) proposes  the  bound  approach  to  model  the  
market  size–market  structure  relationship  and  distinguish  the  equilibrium  
structure  between  the  two  types  of industries.  The  relationship  between  the  
market  size  and market  concentration is  traditionally  thought  to  be inversely  
related (see  e.g. Dick,  2007). However,  Sutton (1991) argues that  this inverse  
size–structure relationship is valid only for certain groups of industries, while it  
breaks  down  for  industries  in  which  shifting  consumer  demand  relies  on  the  
fixed  rather  than  variable  costs.  The  empirical  estimation  of  the  relationship  
plots  a lower  bound  to  concentration.  For  exogenous  sunk  costs industry,  the  
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lower bound would be sharply decreasing and eventually approaches zero with  
limiting  level  of  concentration  below  1%.  Such  industries  are  of  competitive  
nature where escalating  profits  due  to market expansion induces entry  to  the  
market and hence lowers the concentration level. However, the estimated bound  
is remarkably flat for endogenous sunk costs industries. This would suggest that  
number of entrants is entirely unaffected by the size of market and the industry  
is a natural oligopoly.  
As far as theory goes, the entry to such industries is naturally limited to a handful  
of  firms,  when  quality  improvement  and  shifting  the  technological  frontier  
outward  is  predominantly  due  to  endogenously  determined  fixed  costs.  A  
continuous increase in the level of fixed costs is not always feasible for all firms.  
Therefore, it is believed that there exists a lower bound to the equilibrium level  
of concentration as the number of entrants is unrelated to the market size, and  
hence the market fails to fragment. Conversely, as the market size increases, the  
current  incumbents  will  escalate  their  fixed  investments.  As  a  result,  larger  
markets will not have a greater number of firms; instead the theory predicts that  
there will be an improvement in the quality of products.  
Empirically,  the Sutton’s  (1991) model uses a cross-sectional data and applies  
either maximum likelihood or minimum distance estimator involving the error  
term following the extreme–value Weibull distribution as:  
!,!"' = -( + -$  
ln(("'/2")+ 3"'  
where  !,!"' is  a  logit  transformation  of  the  relevant  concentration  ratio  for  
country i at time t and 3"' > 0. ("' corresponds to the market size and 2" is a proxy  
of set-up cost that captures the minimal sunk cost required by each entrant to the  
industry prior to establishing production.  
Although Sutton’s  theory is developed in  the early nineties and provides solid  
predictions of the size–structure relationship across a broad class of competition  
models,  surprisingly,  the  empirical  applications  of  Sutton’s  theory  has  been  
remarkably sparse. Ellickson (2007) is one of few exceptions. He was the first to  
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test the theory on a large sample of markets within a single industry. His work  
examines the theory’s predictions on the US supermarket industry, where a few  
firms  were  found  to  dominate  the  market  and  capture  the  majority  of  sales  
regardless of the market size. Also, the estimated lower bound was remarkably  
flat, indicating that the market concentration is unaffected by the market size.   
The empirical testing of Sutton’s theory requires defining a proxy of the set-up  
costs, which represent the minimal level of sunk cost required for anyone to enter  
the industry. However, this information is not available for most industries or is  
difficult to estimate. For instance, Dick (2007) applies Sutton framework to the  
US banking industry but the market size was not scaled by the set-up ratio as it  
appears to be that there is no legal minimum. Inasmuch as the Sutton analysis is  
powerful  to make  prediction  about  the  relationship  between market  size  and  
market  concentration,  the  empirical  analysis  requires  data  on  entry  
requirements,  which  are  not  easy  to  come  by.  The  limited  empirical  research  
testing of Sutton’s theory owes to failure to obtain these data because it either  
does not exist at the micro level or cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality.   
Several  critics  question  the  ability  of  structural  approaches  to  capture  the  
competitive conduct of a market. One criticism of much of the literature on the  
use of structural approaches as a proxy of competition centres around the role of  
market  contestability.  Contestability  theory,  as  initially  advanced  by  Baumol  
(1982) and Baumol et al. (1982), claims that alternate market conditions of no  
sunk  costs  and  possibility  of  hit-and-run  entry  can  undermine  the  degree  of  
competition in a market. Another important criticism is advanced by Claessens  
and  Laeven  (2004),  who  find  no  empirical  evidence  supporting  the  inverse  
concentration-competition  relationship.  Even  more  surprisingly,  significant  
market  power  is  found  in  highly  unconcentrated  markets.  This  assertion  is  
further supported by Schaeck et al. (2009), who examined competition conduct  
in  45  banking systems  worldwide.  The  investigation  results  show  that  
concentration  and  competition  describe  different  characteristics  of  banking  
markets. 
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Likewise, a considerable amount of empirical banking literature has shown that  
concentration  is  a  poor  measure  of  competition (Berger  et  al.,  2004;  Shaffer,  
1993, 1999, 2002a; Shaffer & DiSalvo, 1994). Some of these studies have found  
banks’ behaviour considerably more competitive than proposed by the market  
structure, whereas other studies have found significantly higher market power  
than would  be implied  by  the market  structure.  Since  the mismatch  can  keep  
running in either directions, structural approaches are tremendously unreliable  
measure of performance (Bikker et al., 2012).   
The existing pitfalls and limitations in the structural approaches have led to the  
embodiment of non-structural approaches that rely on comparative statistics of  
profit-maximising firms.   
5. Non-structural Approaches (NEIO Theory)  
The various limitations of structural approaches are refined by New Empirical  
Industrial  Organisation  (NEIO)  techniques,  which  measure  the  degree  of  
competition  directly  without  explicitly  using  any  market  structure  indicator.  
NEIO techniques include a variety of methodologies requiring different data and  
assumptions to measure the degree of market power in an industry. Compared  
to the structural measures, the main advantage of these approaches is that they  
focus  on  the  deviation  of  output  price  from  marginal  cost  rather  than  
profitability,  and  therefore  offer  a  more  robust  theoretical  base  on  which  to  
estimate  competitive  conditions  in  the  banking  sector.  These  approaches  are  
distinguished  by  measuring  competition  without  the  explicit  use  of  a  market  
structure indicator, hence are called ‘non-structural’ (Matthews et al., 2007; Beck  
et  al., 2013).  Non-structural  approaches  can  be  further  classified  into  two  
generations.  
The  first  generation  of  non-structural  approaches  is  based  on  the  oligopoly  
theory or the so-called ‘neoclassical conception of competition’ as well as a static  
model  of  competition.  These  approaches  include  the  Lerner  Index  (Lerner,  
1934),  the  conjectural  variation  model  (Iwata,  1974),  the  Panzar-Rosse  H  
statistic (Rosse & Panzar, 1977; Panzar & Rosse, 1982, 1987), and the Bresnahan- 
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Lau mark-up model (Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982). Although the first generation  
of  non-structural  approaches  generally  share  a  common  standard  theoretical  
framework, the models often draw divergent conclusions. The second generation  
of non-structural approaches, conversely, focuses on capturing the dynamics of  a 
market rather than a static condition and is therefore in line with the Austrian  
dynamic concept of competition. These include the persistence of profits model  
(Muller,  1977,  1986),  the  Hall-Roeger  model  (Hall,  1988;  Roeger,  1995);  the  
Boone  Indicator  (Boone,  2008);  the  competition  efficiency  frontier  (Bolt  &  
Humphrey,  2010),  and  the  lower  bound  to  concentration  approach  recently  
proposed by Tabacco (2013).   
In most of the NEIO techniques, banks’ inputs and outputs have to be determined  
via a banking firm model. Three fundamental models have been identified in the  
literature. Under the intermediation model developed by Klein (1971) and Sealey  
and  Lindley  (1977),  the  production  function  of  banks  employs  labour  and  
physical capital to generate deposits, which in turn are transferred into funding  
loans and other earning assets. The model thus identifies three main inputs that  
banks use to generate their outputs: price of deposits (ratio of interest expense  
to  total  deposits),  price  of  labour  (ratio  of  wage  expenses  to  the  number  of  
personnel), and price of physical capital (ratio of total expenses on fixed assets  to 
the total value of fixed assets).   
The  other  two  main  models  apply  comparative  definitions  with  two  vital  
refinements. In the value-added model (A. Berger & Humphrey, 1992), deposits  
are  classified  as  outputs  rather  than  inputs.  The  core  idea  behind  this  
classification is that deposits provide depositors with valuable services in terms  
of safe storage of value, record keeping and as a means of payment for some type  
of  deposits.  On  the  other  hand,  the  user-cost  model  (Hancock,  1985,  1991)  
applies a different categorisation of bank inputs and outputs. Demand deposits  
act as bank outputs, given the positive net revenue earned on these accounts on  
average,  whereas  other  types  of  deposits  act  as  bank inputs  due  the  fact  that  
banks have to pay a positive net user cost to attract and maintain those  funds.  
Further empirical evidence, however, recommends that deposits overall behave  
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primarily  as  bank  inputs (Gilligan  &  Smirlock,  1984;  Hughes  &  Mester,  
1993;  Shaffer, 1994).  
There is a large debate in the academic literature concerning the reliability of the  
different competition measures. As a matter of fact, the literature on measuring  
market  power  in  banking  industries  has  revealed  several  contrasting  themes,  
since  different  research  methodologies  yield  different  findings  regarding  the  
market  structure  and  competitive  conditions  even  when  applied  to  the  same  
banking market. While some authors prefer one methodology over another, all  
methodologies  have  both  advantages  and  drawbacks.  The  application  of  a  
specific methodology is usually constrained by data availability and complexity  
of econometric techniques needed (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Carbó et al., 2009;  
Bikker & Spierdijk,  2010; Bikker et al.,  2012). The  vast majority  of  studies  on  
investigating the degree of competition in banking have utilised the Lerner Index,  
the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, the Bresnahan-Lau Model and the Boone indicator,  
making these measures the most widely applied in the banking literature.   
This  section  focuses  on  the  most  widely  applied  measures  of  competition  
mentioned above and will briefly discuss the others while illustrating their main  
advantages and drawbacks.  
5.1. First Generation of Non-structural Approaches  
Lerner Index (Lerner, 1934)  
The deviation of output price from marginal cost is the essence of market power.  
In theory, a perfectly competitive firm operates at the point where price equals  
marginal cost. Ceteris paribus, a divergence between these values in the long run  
indicates  the  existence  of  monopoly  power.  This  divergence  reflects  both  
allocative and distributive effects of monopoly power, which may be positive or  
negative in their overall effect on public welfare (Lerner, 1934). The traditional  
Lerner Index (or price-cost margin) is defined as the ratio of disparity between  
firm’s output price and its marginal cost  to  the output price. Algebraically,  the  
Lerner Index can be computed as: 
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where P and MC are firm i’s price and marginal cost respectively. Under standard  
presumptions, the Lerner Index ranges from zero in highly competitive markets  
up to the theoretical limit of one, where firms’ market power become greater. In  
the  banking  framework,  the  Lerner  index  captures  the  mark-up  that  banks  
charge to their clients by ascertaining the distinction between loan interest rates  
and marginal costs and communicating it as an extent of the previous. Per se, the  
Lerner  price-marginal  cost  index  can  be  considered  as  a  direct  measure  of  
competition (Beighley & McCall, 1975; Agoraki et al., 2011; Coccorese, 2014).   
A  considerable  amount  of  literature  has  been  published  on  testing  the  
competitive conditions in the banking systems applying the Lerner Index. These  
studies are considered relatively recent, given the development of this approach  
since the mid-1930s. The relatively recent application of the Lerner Index is due  
to the difficulty associated with the assessment of banks’ marginal costs. In one  
of the earliest studies, Beighley and McCall (1975) applied the Lerner Index to  
measure the market power of the US commercial banking market over the year  
1968. The  Lerner measurements indicate  that American  banks’ market power  
increased with the existence of fewer banks in the market, greater inequalities  
among banks, and larger market shares.   
Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) derived the calculation of the marginal costs from  
Iwata's (1974) approach and computed the Lerner Index to capture the dynamic  
evolution of banking competition in Italy between 1983 to 1997. The competitive  
conditions seem to be stable prior to 1992 and increased substantially after this  
year,  suggesting  that  the  wave  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  mainly  improved  
Italian  banks’  efficiency.  While  banking  competition  remained  unchanged  in  
Spain during 1986-1998 (Carbó Valverdie et al., 2003), a growing trend in market  
power  and  concentration  can  be  seen  in  five  European  countries  during  the  
1990s:  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain  and  the  UK  (Maudos  &  Fernández  de  
Guevara, 2004; Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005). Similar results are also found  
in  larger  cross-country  studies  that  included  15  European  Union  banking  
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markets (Fernández de Guevara et al., 2007; Maudos & Fernández de Guevara,  
2007; Carbó et al., 2009).  
On the one hand, many researchers have investigated the competitive conditions  
using  the  Lerner  Index  for individual  countries  banking  markets  including,  
among others, Koetter and Poghosyan (2009), Hackethal et al.(2012) and Inklaar 
et al. (2015) for Germany; Delis et al. (2017) for  the US; Kasman and Kasman  
(2016) for Turkey; Nguyen et al. (2016) for Vietnam, China and India; as well as  
Tan  (2016) for  China.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  a  number  of  large  cross  
country studies which compare the Lerner Indices and market power over a large  
group of banking industries (Berger et al., 2009; Turk-Ariss, 2010; Agoraki et al.,  
2011; Coccorese, 2014; Efthyvoulou & Yildirim, 2014; Mirzaei & Moore, 2014;  
Clerides et al., 2015; Leroy & Lucotte, 2015; Delis et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2016;  
Kouki & Al-Nasser, 2017).  
More  recently, Koetter  et  al. (2012) proposed  a  simple  adjustment  to  the  
calculation of the Lerner indices to take into account cost and profit inefficiencies  
that  exist  in  numerous  firms,  which  are  implicitly  assumed  to  be  zero  in  
unadjusted  Lerner  indices.  Koetter  et  al.  (2012) argue  that  adjusted  Lerner  
indices tend to be significantly larger than conventional Lerner indices and trend  
upward  over  time.  Similarly, Brämer et  al. (2013) demonstrate  that  modified  
Lerner Indices are more qualified indicators of market power than conventional  
ones. This view is further supported by Huang et al. (2016) as well as Huang et  al. 
(2018) who jointly estimate  the Lerner index and cost efficiency in a single  step, 
using stochastic frontier methodology that appears to be a novel idea in the  
literature. Like Koetter et al. (2012), the models of Huang et al. (2016) and Huang  
et  al.  (2017) produce  higher  mean  values  of  the  Lerner  Index  and  smaller  
standard deviations in comparison to the conventional approach.  
The key advantage with this measure of competition is that it can be applied at  
the  bank  level  as  well  as  over  time.  The  Lerner  Index  is  therefore  capable  
of  capturing various patterns of behaviour within the market at any one time, and  
also  over  a  period  of  years.  Moreover,  geographical  market  definition  is  not  
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required  when  calculating  the  Lerner  Index,  which  is  another  potential  
advantage  in  contrast  to  market  concentration  measures (Beck  et  al.,  2013).  
Shaffer (2004a) further supports the Lerner Index by arguing that it proves to be  
related  to  other  NEIO  techniques  that  are  formally  derived  from  profit  
maximising equilibrium conditions. This is exemplified in the work undertaken  
by Beck et al. (2013), who show that aggregate Lerner indices are significantly  
and  statistically  related  with  other  measures  of  competition  and  market  
structure,  particularly  the  Panzar-Rosse  H-statistic,  market  share,  number  of  
banks, HHI and CR3. Similarly, Delis (2012) notes a high correlation between the  
Boon  Indicators  and  the  Lerner  indices  at  bank-level  for  84  banking  systems  
worldwide. However, although the Lerner Index is characterised by its simplicity  
of calculation despite a limited number of observations and its straightforward  
interpretation, several authors have pointed out its shortcomings.   
Some authors argue that a major theoretical drawback of the Lerner Index is that  
it is a measure of pricing market power rather  than a proxy of competition as  
there  are  other  possible  scenarios  in  which  price-cost  margins  increase  with  
more fierce competition (Stiglitz, 1987, 1989; Cairns, 1995; Bulow & Klemperer,  
2002). Other authors maintain that Lerner Indices may over-estimate the banks’  
market power when risk taking is taken into account (Fernández de Guevara et  
al., 2005; Oliver, Fumás, & Saurina, 2006; Berger et al., 2009). Vives (2008)  adds  
to  the  above  arguments  by  asserting  the  inability  of  the  Lerner  Index  to  
appropriately measure the degree of product substitutability. As a matter of fact,  
Boone (2008) and Boone et al. (2013) maintain that individual Lerner Indices, if  
converted  to a weighted average Lerner  Index, may not necessarily reflect  the  
average degree of market power due to the reallocation effect from inefficient to  
efficient  firms.  Efficient  firms  have  higher  price-cost  margins  than  their 
counterparts.  Thus,  the  weighted  average  Lerner  index  can  increase  if  the  
increase  in  the  market  share  of  more  efficient  firms  overcompensates  the  
decrease in the respective individual Lerner indices.   
Conjectural Variation Model (Iwata, 1974) 
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Conjectural  variation  represents  the  reaction  of  one  firm  to  change in market  
shares and pricing by its rivals and is a key concept in oligopoly theories. Iwata's  
(1974) pioneer  model  has  proposed  an  econometric  approach  to  estimate  
numerical  values  of  conjectural  variation  for  firms  supplying  homogenous  
products in an oligopolistic market of a small number of  firms serving a large  
number of consumers. The value of the conjectural variation can be calculated by  
defining  the  marginal  cost  and  the  price elasticity  for  each  firm.  This  will  be  
accomplished by estimating the firm’s cost function and market demand function  
respectively,  while  maintaining  three  essential  assumptions,  i.e.  that  price  
elasticity of demand, firm’s marginal cost, and conjectural variation are constant  
for  each  firm  in  each  period.  The  value  of  conjectural  variation  under  this  
approach must be larger than -1 (Iwata, 1974).   
The  established  model  can  generally  be  used  as  an  effective  method  for  an  
empirical analysis of firms with homogenous products in an oligopolistic market.  
However,  applications  of  the Iwata  (1974) model in  the  banking industry  are  
very  rare and  posed  difficulties given  the lack  of  necessary micro-data  on  the  
structure  of  cost  and  production (Bikker  &  Haaf,  2002).  Spiller  and  Favaro's  
(1984) study is  the  first application of  the Iwata  (1974) model  to  the banking  
market. The  results indicate  that  strategic behaviour  of incumbent Uruguayan  
banks  is  highly  affected  by  threats  of  entry,  whereas  conjectures  are  
heterogeneous among banks between 1977 and 1980. Further applications are  
undertaken  by  Gelfand  and  Spiller  (1987) and  Berg  and  Kim  (1994) for  
Uruguayan and Norwegian banking industries respectively.    
A  broader  perspective  has  been  adopted  by  Shaffer  and  DiSalvo  (1994) who  
combine  the  conjectural  variation  model  with  the  Panzar-Rosse  H-statistic  to  
empirically test the conduct of a banking duopoly market in Fulton Country in  
south  central  Pennsylvania  over  the  period  1970-1986.  Both  methodologies  
suggest  that  banks’  behaviour  appears  imperfectly  competitive,  but  far  from  
collusive. To the best of current knowledge, these are the only applications that  
exist for the Iwata (1974) model in the banking industry. 
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Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (Rosse & Panzar, 1977)  
The Panzar-Rosse  (PR) H-statistic model was initially developed by Rosse and  
Panzar (1977) and expanded later by Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987). Its basic  
idea is that each bank adopts an altered pricing strategy in response to a change  
in input prices, depending on the structure of the market in which banks operate.  
The PR test is based on properties of a reduced form log-linear revenue equation,  
rather than a structural equation, at the firm or bank level, and uses a test statistic  
H.   
The bank revenue function is estimated, in which bank revenues are explained  
by input prices, bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables that affect  
the banking market as a whole. The H-statistic of the Panzar-Rosse model is then  
calculated as the sum of the elasticities of total revenue with respect to each of  
the bank’s input prices. Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982,  
1987) demonstrate  that  this  measure  is  negative  or  equal  to  zero  for  a  
neoclassical  monopolist  or  collusive oligopolistic  situation,  between  zero  and  
one  for a monopolistic competitor, and equal  to unity  for a competitive price 
taking  bank  in  long-run  competitive  equilibrium.  Figure  2.3 summarises  the  
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic calculations and interpretation.  
In  order  to  obtain  valid  results,  three  assumptions  should  be  satisfied.  First,  
banks  must  be  treated  as  single-product  firms.  Second,  there  should  be  no  
correlation between greater input costs and greater quality services that would  
generate larger  revenues,  as  such  correlation may lead  to  a  biased H-statistic  
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Figure 2.3. Extraction and interpretation of the PR H-statistic.  
Source: Apergis, et al., (2016) 
value.  Lastly,  all  banks  included  in  the  test  must  operate  under  long-run  
equilibrium conditions (De Bandt & Davis, 2000; Bikker & Haaf, 2002a; Yildirim  
& Philippatos, 2007; Schaeck et al., 2009; Akin et al., 2013).   
The pioneering work of Rosse and Panzar (1977) was the first application of a  
monopoly power  test. The H-statistic has been estimated using cross-sectional  
data for newspaper firms in the local media market (Rosse & Panzar, 1977). In  
the banking industry, there have been extensive applications of the Panzar and  
Rosse methodology to assess the competitiveness of the banking sectors in many  
countries around the world.  
One of the first applications of the Panzar-Rosse model in the banking sector is  
that  of  Shaffer (1982).  For  a  sample  of  US  banks,  the  test  results  showed  
the  existence  of  monopolistic  competition  among  New  York  banks  in  1979.  
This  application  was  followed  by Nathan  and  Neave’s (1989) study  of  a  sample  
of  Canadian banks. The empirical results reported perfect competition conditions  
in  the  Canadian  banking  market  during  1982  and  monopolistic  competition  
conditions between the years 1983 and 1984.   
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Using  the  same  model,  Molyneux  et  al.  (1994) found  a  monopoly  market  
structure  in  Italy,  whereas  monopolistic  competition  held  for  the  banking  
markets  of  France,  Germany,  Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Similarly,  
monopolistic  competition  condition  has  been  the  market  structure  across  
Finnish  banks (Vesala,  1995),  Japanese  banks (Philip  Molyneux  et  al.,  1996),  
Greek  banks  (Hondroyiannis  et  al.,  1999),  South  Eastern  European  banks  
(Mamatzakis et al., 2005) and major British banks (Matthews et al., 2007).   
The case of  Italy has yielded contrasting results. While Molyneux et al. (1994) 
argue that Italian banks behave monopolistically, Coccorese (2004) and Trivieri  
(2007) claim that they operate under monopolistic competition conditions. Even  
more interestingly, Goddard and Wilson (2009) suggest that the Italian banking  
market is distinguished by the perfect competition extreme. They also argue 
that  UK banks possess more market power than proposed by Matthews et al. 
(2007).  Updated  evidence  in  favour  of  monopolistic  competition  among  
several  European Union banking markets is also found in more recent 
applications of the  Panzar-Rosse model (Delis, 2010; Moch, 2013; Weill, 2013; 
Apergis et al., 2016).  
Research  by De Bandt and Davis (2000) in  France, Germany,  Italy and  the US  
differentiates between types of banks. The empirical findings suggest that small  
banks enjoy more monopoly power than large ones. This view is supported by  
Bikker and Haaf (2002a), who  find  that competition is stronger between large  
banks  and  weaker  between  small  banks  in  the  banking  markets  of  industrial  
countries.   
A  significant  analysis  and  discussion  of  the  drivers  of  bank  competition  using  
international  evidence  was  presented  by  Claessens  and  Laeven (2004).  For  a  
sample  of  50  countries,  the  PR  model  results  show  monopolistic  competition  
conditions  in  all  of  the  banking  markets  examined.  Other  authors  have  
highlighted the homogeneity in competitive banking markets conditions around  
the  world  based  on  large  cross-country  comparisons,  and  many  studies  have  
reported monopolistic competitive banking environments (Schaeck et al., 2009;  
Chen & Liao, 2011; Anginer et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2014).  
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In the mid-2000s, studies investigating degrees of banking market power were  
extended  to  emerging  economies.  Many  authors  applied  the  PR  model  to  the  
banking markets of several Asian and Latin American countries. Similar  to  the  
case of most European countries, most of these studies have rejected hypotheses  
of  monopoly  and  perfect  competition  supporting  monopolistic  competition  
conditions (Perera et al., 2006; Yuan, 2006; Günalp & Çelik, 2006; Yeyati & Micco,  
2007; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007; Park, 2009; Jeon et al., 2011; Olivero et al.,  
2011; Daley & Matthews, 2012; Liu et al., 2012; Akin et al., 2013; Apergis, 2015;  
Tabak et al., 2015; Barbosa et al., 2015; Mulyaningsih et al., 2015).    
There is a relatively small body of literature that is concerned with examining the  
market  structure  and  competitive  conditions  of  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council  
(GCC)  region. One  study  by Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) examined  the  trend  of  
competition in the six countries, which are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi  
Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). The PR model outcomes reveal perfectly  
competitive banking markets in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Conversely, lower  
degrees of market power and monopolistically competitive behaviour have been  
noticed  in  Bahrain  and  Qatar.  The study  however  states  that  competitive  
conditions in Oman should be considered undetermined since the estimated H 
statistic  and  hypothesis  testing  yields  contrasting  results.  A  number  of  other  
studies have examined the market power in some GCC countries either as a part  
of  Arab  Middle  East (Murjan  &  Ruza,  2002),  the  Middle  East  Northern  Africa  
(MENA) region (Turk-Ariss, 2009),  or as a part of global perspective (Turk-Ariss,  
2010).   
The PR model has dramatically grown in popularity and is considered to be the  
most widely applied test for competition in the banking industry with more than  
500 journal articles listed in Google Scholar since 2012 alone (Shaffer & Spierdijk,  
2015). The popularity of this valuable tool for gauging the degree of competition  
in  banking  markets  is  mainly  attributable  to  its  straightforwardness,  
transparency,  and  efficiency.  Also,  information  accessibility  turns  out  to  be  
substantially  less  of  a  constraint,  since  bank  income  is  more  prone  to  be  
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discernible  (as  opposed  to  output  prices).  Additionally,  by  using  bank-level  
information, this methodology takes into consideration bank-specific contrasts  in 
the production function (Mamatzakis et al., 2005; Trivieri, 2007; Delis, 2010).  A  
critical  feature  of  the  Panzar-Rosse  methodology  is  that  it  measures  the  
monopoly power and analyses the competitive conduct of banks without utilising  
explicit information about market structure (Bikker & Haaf, 2002a).   
However,  there  are  certain  drawbacks  associated  with  the  use  of  the  
Panzar Rosse  H-statistic  as  a  measure  of  market  power.  One  of  these  is  
that  false  indication of market structure can be yielded if  the market is not 
operating in  long-run equilibrium. In other words, the risk-adjusted rates of 
return should be  equalised across banks in equilibrium competitive capital 
markets and rates of  return are uncorrelated with factor prices (Shaffer, 
2004b).   
Another drawback is shown in a recent study of Bikker et al. (2012). The authors  
have  recognised  several  situations in which  the  sign  and magnitude  of  the H 
statistic do not correspond to the market structure as commonly believed. The  
study shows that a valid measure of competitive conduct should be assessed by  
using only an unscaled revenue equation that requires additional information on  
cost  and market  equilibrium. Using  price  equation  or  scaled  revenue  function  
would not yield valid inferences on  the degree of market power. This study is  
complemented by Shaffer and Spierdijk (2015) who show that the H-statistic of  
the PR model can be positive or negative for any degree of competition. However,  
Shaffer and Spierdijk (2015) conclude that the Panzar-Rosse revenue test cannot  
be  used  as  a  measure  of  competitive  conditions  (neither  as  a  quantitative  
measure, nor as a one-sided measure). This conclusion has stark implications for  
the  huge  body  of  banking  literature,  especially  those  with  important  policy  
implications.   
Bresnahan-Lau (1982) Mark-up Model   
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) propose a simultaneous equation model that  
is  based  on  the  conjectural  variation  method  of  Iwata  (1974),  but  solves  the  
econometric  identification  problem  presented  in  the  Iwata  (1974)  model  
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through  utilising  an  alternative  parametrisation  given  by  the  conjectural  
variation  elasticity (Shaffer,  1983;  Toolsema,  2002).  The  key  idea  behind  the  
empirical model relies on the fact that profit-maximising firms will select prices  
or quantities such that their perceived marginal revenue equals the marginal cost  
('") = '!), which coincides with the demand price under perfect competitive  
equilibrium ('") = 7). This, however, corresponds  to  the industry’s marginal  
revenue in extreme collusive conditions ('") = '") (Bresnahan, 1982, 1989).   
Non-linear  simultaneous  estimation  of  a  two-equation  system,  the  market  
demand and supply equations, parametrise the markup of price over estimated  
marginal cost as an index of market power (:). The estimated demand equation  
can be regarded as first-order local approximation of the true aggregate demand  
function and the supply equation is based on the profit maximisation assumption.  
The estimated monopoly power index represents the extent of deviation of the  
average firm’s perceived marginal revenue schedule from the industry demand  
schedule and  therefore captures the degree of market power exercised by firms  
in the sample (Shaffer, 1989, 1993; Toolsema, 2002).   
The conjectural variation elasticity values range between zero and one (0 ≤ : ≤ 
1)  parallelism  to  the  economic  theory  that  admits  only  these  values  under  
equilibrium  conditions.  Price  taker  firms  in  perfect  competitive  conditions  
equate their perceived marginal revenue with the industry demand price. This  
means that there is no deviation which coincides with the value of : = 0. At the  
opposite extreme, a value of : = 1 determines a difference between  the  firm’s  
perceived marginal revenue and the demand functions. Consequently, firms act  
as a joint monopoly under perfect collusive conditions.  Intermediate  values of  
the market power index (0 < : < 1) represent other oligopoly solution concepts  
of  imperfect  competition  or  collusion  (Bresnahan,  1982;  Suominen,  1994;  
Shaffer, 1993, 2002; Uchida & Tsutsui, 2005; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2013).   
Besides being a measure of market power, −: serves as a local estimate of the  
percentage deviation of aggregate output from the competitive equilibrium level  
of output. In this sense, −: suggests a measure of aggregate excess capacity. If  
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−: < 0, then the actual output produced seems to be less than the competitive  
equilibrium  level.  More  interestingly,  if  −: > 0,  then  the  actual  output  level  
appears  to  surpass  the  competitive  equilibrium  level,  though  static  allocative  
efficiency  requires  a  marginal  cost  pricing  outcome  of  : = 0 (Shaffer,  1993,  
2004b; Gruben & Mccomb, 2003).  
Like  any  other  model,  the  Bresnahan-Lau  mark-up  model  relies  on  some  
established assumptions. The model assumes firms to follow profit-maximising  
behaviour and risk-neutral attitude. Firms are also assumed  to be price  takers  
with regard to their inputs (Bresnahan, 1982; Toolsema, 2002). A fundamental  
and sufficient condition to econometrically identify : is that the demand function  
must not be separable in at least one exogenous variable that is included in the  
demand function but excluded from the marginal cost function (Lau, 1982).  
In the area of banking, this method was first applied by Shaffer (1989, 1993) to  
samples of US and Canadian banks respectively. Suominen (1994) extended the  
Bresnahan-Lau model to the case of two-products model and found fairly intense  
competitive conduct in the Finnish banking market prior to the deregulation in  
the mid-1980s. A dynamic version of  the model has been developed by Swank  
(1995) to test the degree of competition in the Dutch loans and savings market.  
The test results reveal that both markets were more oligopolistic than Cournot  
competition.   
The applications of this technique may yield different conclusions regarding the  
state of market power even if applied to the same banking market. An example of  
this is  the  case  of  the US  banking market, where  the  results have  been mixed  
across  different  applications (Shaffer,  1996,  1999;  Zardkoohi  &  Fraser,  1998;  
Chang et al., 2012). Conversely, a number of applications  to  the same banking  
market  may  suggest  similar  competitive  conditions  as  in  the  Italian  banking  
market  that  tends  to  operate  under  imperfect  competition (Coccorese,  1998,  
2005, 2008, 2009; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2013). In addition, significant market  
power  and  collusive  cartel-like  conduct  have  been  found in  several  European  
banking markets (Neven & Röller, 1999; Shaffer, 2001). 
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Shaffer  (2002b) has  contributed  to  the  Bresnahan-Lau  model  in  two  ways.  
Firstly,  by  utilising  firm-specific  data  rather  than  industry-aggregate  data  as  
originally derived and applied. Secondly, by relying on a marginal cost function  
implied  by  translog  cost  function  that  is  more  flexible  than  the  original  form  
suggested by Bresnahan (1982). Using  this approach,  the competitive conduct  
among Swiss banks seems to vary across ownership structures. The most market  
power was exhibited by foreign-owned banks, while the least market power was  
observed  in  state-owned  and  mutual  banks.  Further  applications  of  the  
Bresnahan-Lau mark-up model includes, among others, Toolsema (2002) for the  
Dutch  consumer  credit  market,  Gruben  and  Mccomb (2003) for  the  Mexican,  
Canhoto  (2004) for  the  Portuguese,  and  Uchida  and  Tsutsui  (2005) for  the  
Japanese, as well as Qin and Shaffer (2014) for the Chinese banking market.   
This  method  is  particularly  useful  in  studying  the  level  of  competition  in  the  
banking sector since it assimilates an index of banks’ behaviour by gauging their  
actual  deviation  from  marginal  cost  pricing  and  thus  it  is  relevant  to  public  
welfare.  Another  distinguishing  feature  of  the  Bresnahan-Lau  model  is  that  
it  does not require any particular definition of banking markets within a country  
and estimates of the conjectural variation elasticity remain valid and unbiased  
regardless  of  the  country’s  banking  regulations  and  the  banking  market  
disequilibrium (Shaffer, 2002b, 2004b). This technique also remains a robust and  
valid  measure  of  conduct  even  if  demand  and  costs  functions  are  measured  
imperfectly (Genesove & Mullin, 1998).   
An implicit assumption arising from treating the conjectural variation elasticity  
as a continuous variable is that banks have continuous reaction functions. This  
parametrisation  therefore  can  represent any  form  of  oligopoly  behaviour  that  
arises  from  either  static  or  dynamic  game  (Shaffer,  1996).  Furthermore,  as  
mentioned earlier, the model overcomes the econometric identification problem  
in the Iwata (1974) method and is based on industry aggregate data rather than  
firm-specific  data  that are  usually less available.  Finally,  the model enjoys  the  
ability to cope with monopsony power without the need to revisit the model and  
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embody a direct relationship with a natural measure of excess capacity (Shaffer,  
2001, 2002b, 2004b; Coccorese, 2009).  
The main disadvantage of the Bresnahan-Lau method is that the interpretation  of 
the market power index can reveal anticompetitive biasness if the sample used  
fails  to  span  complete markets.  This is  a  particular  concern  for  cross-country  
samples  if  the  researcher  estimates  the  market  demand  without  taking  into  
consideration  the  correction  for  cross-border  competition  (Shaffer,  2001,  
2002b).  Tabak et  al. (2012) point  out  that  the  detailed  data  requirement  on  
demand  and  costs illustrates  a  challenge in  this model    as  they  are  not  easily  
available.  Moreover,  negative  values  of  the  market  power  index  that  refer  to  
pricing below marginal cost can result  from several causes such as  temporary  
attempts  to  gain  market  share  and  unforeseen  loan  losses  (Shaffer,  1999).  
Likewise, the estimated market power index embodies the average value of bank  
behaviour  over  many  years  encompassing  the  sample  period.  For  instance,  
a  combination  of  perfect  competitive  behaviour  in  some  years  and  imperfect  
competitive  behaviour in  other  years would generate an average  of imperfect  
competitive behaviour (Shaffer, 2004b; Uchida & Tsutsui, 2005).  
5.2. Second Generation of Non-structural Approaches  
Persistence of Profits Model (Mueller, 1977, 1986)  
A  widely  held  view  is  that  abnormal  profits  are  usually  associated  with  high  
concentration and entry barriers. The persistence of profits model developed by  
Muller (1977, 1986) doubts this view by providing an empirical investigation of  
the  dynamics  of  firm-level  profits.  The  basis  of  this  approach  is  testing  the  
hypothesis that competition abolishes any high profits rapidly and firms’ profit  
rates  will  eventually  converge  toward  their long-run  equilibrium  values.    The  
alternative  hypothesis  is  that  a  few  incumbent  firms  are  either  protected  by  
regulations  or  possess  competitive  advantage  that  can  prevent  imitation  and  
block the entry of new firms. Abnormal profits therefore persist over years and  
convergence  toward  long-run  equilibrium  is  either  slow  or  non-existent.  The  
slow  convergence  rate  toward long-run  equilibrium indicates  stronger  profits  
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persistence and greater departure  from competitive ideal conditions (Mueller,  
1977, 1986).  
Thus  far,  few  studies  have  applied  the  persistence  of  profits  approach  to  the  
banking  industry.  Among  others, Berger  et  al. (2000) find  that  persistence  of  
profits  differs  between  US  commercial  banks  located  at  different  levels  of  
performance distribution. The results suggest that competition impediments and  
informational  opacity  are  the  main  determinants  of  persistence.  In  spite  of  
escalating competition in the European banking markets, there was a significant  
persistence  of  abnormal  profits  during  the  1990s  (Goddard  et  al.,  2004).  
Moreover,  persistence  of  profits  is  positively  correlated  with  ownership  
concentration in the Italian banking market between 1997-2000 (Agostino et al.,  
2005).   
Knapp et al. (2006) reveal that profits among US banks need about five years to  
converge tοwards average industry nοrms. While Bektas (2007) concludes that  
long-run persistency of profits does not exist in the Turkish banking market, the  
findings of Athanasoglou et al. (2008) conversely propose the existence of long  
run  profitability  persistence  to  a  moderate  extent  among  Greek  banks.  The  
results  further  indicate  a  slight  departure  of  the  Greek  banking  market  from  
perfectly competitive conditions.   
A recent study by Goddard et al. (2011) involved large cross-country dynamic  
panel  data  set  of  19  developed  countries  and  46  developing  countries.  The  
empirical  outcomes  show a  positive  relationship  between  persistence  of  bank  
profits and the level of industry concentration as well as the size of entry barriers.  
On  the other hand, persistence of profits is inversely related  to growth rate of  
GDP  per  capita  and  the  H-statistic,  which  is  a  conduct-based  measure  of  
competition  intensity.  Also,  in  countries  with  more  advanced  institutional  
development and strong external governance mechanisms, competition tends to  
be stronger and profitability persistence weaker.  
58  
More  recently, Chronopoulos  et  al. (2015) have  concluded  that  competition  
indirectly erodes  the gain of abnormal profits. Their  findings also suggest  that  
the  recent  financial  crises  have  contributed  towards  higher  levels  of  profit  
persistence  among  US  banks.  In  a  different  region,  Amidu  and Harvey (2016)  
argue  that  there  is  a  high  level  of  profit  persistence  and  relatively  slow  
convergence in 29 African banking markets.  
The dynamic feature of the persistence of profits approach allows the capturing  
of  market  dynamics  from  year  to  year  rather  than  providing  only  a  snapshot  
picture  of a  dynamic  competitive  prοcess as in  static-models-based measures.  
Monopoly profits gained in one period could dissolve in the following, rendering  
intervention by government or regulatory authorities unnecessary. However, the  
application of this approach requires two strong assumptions. First, that entry  
and  exit  to  the  market  are  sufficiently  free  to  allow  the  elimination  of  any  
abnormal profits quickly by competition. Second, that all firms’ profit rates tend  
tο adjust tο the same lοng-run average value. Under a less restrictive version of  
the mοdel, monopoly profits disappear rapidly and the convergence toward long 
run  equilibrium  may  differ  between  firms.  The  requirement  of  such  strong  
assumptions along with complex implementation of the model in highly unstable  
locations,  such  as  developing  countries,  are  the  main  reasons  for  scant  
applications of  the persistence of profits approach  to  the banking industry (A.  
Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2004, 2011; Athanasoglou et al., 2008).  
Hall-Roeger Model (Hall, 1988; Roeger, 1995)  
The  Hall–Roeger  approach  was  originally  proposed  by  Hall  (1988) and  
subsequently extended  by Roeger  (1995). The  basic  realisation  of Hall  
(1988) was  that  in  the  absence  of  monopoly  power,  the  traditional  Solow  
residuals  should be independent of variation in the log change of output. Hall 
(1988) also  criticised  the  reliance  of Bresnahan-Lau mark-up model  on  
specific  functional  form  assumptions  and  suggested  a  non-structural  
reduced  form  approach  instead. In an extension to the work of Hall (1988), 
Roeger (1995) contributes to  this  approach  by  enhancing  the  unbiasedness  
of  the  estimated market  power  parameter through the elimination of 
unobservable productivity shocks. This can  
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be  done  through  observing  the  difference  between  production-based  
(primal)  Solow residuals and cost-based (dual) Solow residuals.  
According to Hindriks (2005), the Hall–Roeger approach can be classified as one  
of  the NEIO  techniques  since  the estimated equation  relates  price  to marginal  
cost and thus can be regarded as a supply relation. In the most compact form, the  
estimated  equation  of  the  Hall-Roeger  model  is: ∆?"' = @ ∆A"'.  In  the  banking  
context, the left-hand side of the equation ∆?"' is the growth of interest income  
per unit of capital, while the right-hand side components include @ (mark-up of  
market-power)  and  ∆A"' (growth  rate  of  input  expenses  per  unit  of  capital  
weighted by input cost shares in output). A value of @ = 1, indicate that banks  
operate under perfectly competitive conditions where banks charge a 7 = '!.  On 
the other hand, a value of @ > 1 suggest  that banks exercise market power  and 
charge prices above their marginal costs (Rezitis, 2010; Mirza et al., 2016).  
The Hall-Roeger approach utilises a novel idea in the literature of measuring the  
degree  of  market  power  in  an  industry,  since  it  uses  the  Solow  residuals  to  
examine the presence of monopoly power. Numerous studies have examined the  
degree of market power using the Hall-Roeger approach in several sectors of the  
economy, particularly the manufacturing sector. Examples include Boyle (2004)  
in  Irish  manufacturing,  Crespi  and  Gao  (2005) in  US  rice  milling,  and  
Wilhelmsson (2006) in the Swedish food industry.  
One  of  the  main  obstacles,  however,  in  utilising  the  Hall-Roeger  approach  is  
maintaining  the  assumption  of  constant  return  to  scale.  Deviation  from  the  
constant return to scale will bias the estimation of the market power parameter  
in either direction, upwards or downwards. Until very recently, the application  
of the Hall-Roeger approach in the banking industry remains a major challenge  
given the strong assumptions and stringent data requirements.  
Up to now,  far too little evidence of market power in the banking industry has  
been  found  using  the  Hall-Roger  model.  Rezitis  (2010) has  provided  an  
alternative method  for estimating mark-up  ratios of  the Hall-Roeger approach  
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that does not involve such strong identifying assumptions as inherent in Hall's  
(1988) and Roeger's (1995) analyses. The study represents the first application  
of the model in the banking industry. Rezitis (2010) has examined the degree of  
competitiveness in the Greek banking system during the pre- and post-mergers  
wave  periods  in  Greece  (1995-1998  and  1999-2004)  using  three  different  
approaches:  the  Panzar-Rosse  H-statistic,  the  Bresnahan-Lau  model,  and  the  
Hall-Roeger  model.  The  results  of  the  Bresnahan–Lau  and  the  Hall–Roeger  
approaches  indicate  a  shift  from  a  competitive  to  a  non-competitive  market  
structure  from  the pre-merger period  to  the post-merger period. This study is  
followed by Mirza et al. (2016) who applied similar methodologies to Pakistani  
banks.  The  results  show  the  tendency  of  banks  in  Pakistan  to  behave  
competitively over the years 2004-2012.   
Boone Indicator (Boone, 2008)  
Recently, Boone (2008) expanded the current set of nοn-structural competition  
measures  by  propοsing  an  index  elaborated  from  the  efficient  structure  
hypothesis that relates firms’ performance to differences in efficiency levels. The  
innovation  behind  Boone's  (2008) work  is  the  measurement  of  competition  
intensity  using  relative  profit  differences.  The  so-called  Boone’s  indicator  is  
based οn the assumption that mοre efficient firms (i.e. firms with lower marginal  
cοsts)  gain  higher  profits  οr  market  shares,  and  moreover,  that  this  effect  is  
stronger the greater the competition in the market.   
The magnitude of the reallocation effect in the banking system can be 
empirically  examined as: B"' = C + - ln ('!"'), where B"' and '!"' represents profits 
and  marginal costs of bank i at time t respectively. - is referred as the Boone 
(2008) indicator.  Since  marginal  costs  cannot  be  observed  directly,  Boone 
(2008) suggests  the  use  of  average  costs  as  a  proxy.  In  other  words, 
Boone's  (2008) model analyses hοw banks’ profits from loans and other 
earning assets cο-vary  with average costs of depοsits and other borrowed 
funds, labour and fixed assets  (Delis, 2012; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014).    
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Intuitively,  the  profits  of  banks with  higher efficiency levels in  terms  of lower  
marginal  costs  are  expected  to  increase,  yielding  negative  values  of  Boone’s  
(2008)  indicator  (- < 0).    Intensifying  the  degree  of  competition  in  a  market  
raises  the  profits  of  more  efficient  banks  relative  to  their  less  efficient  
counterparts.  Greater  absolute  values  of  - (more  negative)  denote  higher  
competition and lower market power. The Boone indicator therefore serves as a  
continuous index of monopoly power (Amidu & Harvey, 2016; Delis, 2012; Leon,  
2015).  
This  methodology  can  be  seen  as  a  robust  measure  of  competition  since  the  
reallocation  effect  is  a  general  feature  of  intensifying  competition.  Although  
different market mechanisms may lead to higher competition (e.g. increase in the  
number  of  bank  service  suppliers  due  to  low  entry  costs),  higher  aggressive  
interaction and relative inefficiencies among banks, the Boone indicator remains  
a  valid  measure  of  competition  as  long  as  the  reallocation  conditions  hold  
(Boone, 2008).   
van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) have investigated the degree of market power in  
five major European Union  countries:  France, Germany,  Italy,  the Netherlands  
and Spain as well as  the UK, US and Japan, utilising the Boone indicator for the  
first  time  in  the  banking  industry.  Their  research  surpasses  Boone’s  (2008)  
original  model  in  two  ways.  Firstly,  by  calculating  the  marginal  costs  from  
a  translog cost  function rather than using average costs as a proxy. Secondly, by  
substituting  profits  with  market  share  as  a  dependent  variable.  Overall,  the  
American  banks  seem  to  operate  under  the  most  competitive  loan  markets.  
German  and  Spanish  banks  similarly  tend  to  have  the  most  competitive  loan  
markets  in  Europe,  whereas  British  and  French  loan  markets  are  the  least  
competitive.   
Using  this  approach,  cross-country  comparisons  have  shown  heterogeneous  
degrees of competition and market power among countries under the same time  
period  given  the  distinct  characteristics  of  the  national  banking  sectors.  An  
example of this is research carried out by Delis (2012) and Clerides et al. (2015),  
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who  studied  over  84  banking  systems  worldwide.  Similar  cases  of  banking  
competition  heterogeneity  are  also  found  within  the  Latin  American  and  
Caribbean banking markets (Tabak et al., 2012; Kasman & Carvallo, 2014), the  US 
and the European banking markets (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013; Brissimis  et  
al.,  2014;  Schaeck  &  Cihák,  2014),  as  well  as  emerging  economies  banking  
markets  (Duygun  et  al.,  2015).  Interestingly,  African  banking  regions  have  
witnessed  quite  similar  levels  of  competition  (Amidu  &  Harvey,  2016;  Léon,  
2016; Nguyen et al., 2016).   
Further applications of Boone’s (2008) indicator to the banking sectors include  
Jeon  and  Lim (2013) for  Korea;  Kasman  and  Kasman (2015) for  Turkey;  Kar  
(2016) for  ten  vibrant  microfinance  markets:  Bangladesh,  India,  Nepal,  
Indonesia, the Philippines, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Peru; Khan et  
al. (2016) for five ASEAN countries: Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines  
and Thailand; as well as Xu et al. (2016) for China.   
The Boone indicator has a number of advantages over the traditional structural  
measures  of competition and  some non-structural measures  of competition. A  
major  benefit  of  the  Boone  indicator  is  the  ability  to  measure  competition  
of  different banking market segments and different bank categories, whereas 
many  well-known market  power measures  consider  the entire  banking market  
only  (van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011; Tabak et al., 2012). Another appealing feature 
of  this approach is that it overcomes the shortcomings associated with traditional  
structural measures of competition, such as the HHI and 3-bank concentration  
ratio. Unlike concentration measures that captures the outcome of competitive  
conduct, the Boone indicator is capable of capturing interaction between banks  
by  focusing  on  conduct.  A  notable  example  is  the  increase  in  concentration  
indices  in  cases  of  banks  failure  or  mergers  that  resulted  initially  from  high  
rivalry  conditions.  Hence,  relying  on  concentration  measures  as  a  proxy  of  
competition  may  result  in  misleading  inferences  (Schaeck  &  Cihák,  2014;  
Clerides  et  al.,  2015).  The  importance  of  this  feature  stems  from  the  recent  
literature conclusions about a very weak relationship between concentration and  
competition in  banking industries (A. Berger et al.,  2004;  Claessens &  Laeven,  
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